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Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education
(02-1672)
Ruling Below: (Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 309 F.3d, 1333 (11th Cir. 2002), 83
Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,235, 170 Ed. Law Rep. 539, 15 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1129, cert granted
124 S.Ct. 2834, 71 USLW 3736, 72 USLW 3749, 188 Ed. Law Rep. 619 (2004)). The solicitor
General was invited to submit a brief expressing the views of the United States, 124 S.Ct. 365,
157 L.Ed.2d 20 (2004).
A former girls high school basketball team coach, Roderick Jackson, complained of inferior
conditions for the girls' varsity team. He thereafter received poor evaluation marks and was fired
as a coach, though he remained on the payroll as a physical education teacher. Jackson sued the
Birmingham Board of Education for unlawful retaliation under Title IX. The lower court
dismissed the suit claiming there was not private right of action for retaliation under Title IX.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Title IX does not create a
private right of action for retaliation when the claimant did not suffer gender discrimination but
merely complained of discrimination suffered by others.
Question Presented: Whether retaliation violates Title IX, whether someone alleging retaliation
can bring a private lawsuit, & whether someone who complains of but is not the direct victim of
sex discrimination can bring such suit.
Roderick JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant
V.
BIRMINGHAM BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Appellee
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
Decided October 21, 2002
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
MARCUS, Circuit Judge:
Roderick Jackson appeals the dismissal of
his complaint alleging that the Birmingham
Board of Education (the "Board") retaliated
against him in violation of Title LX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX"),
20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., and the regulations
implementing it. While employed by the
Board as the coach of a girl's basketball
team, Jackson complained about practices
that he believed discriminated against his
team in violation of Title LX. The school, he
maintains, retaliated against him by
removing him from his coaching position.
The q uestion b efore u s is whether Title IX
implies a private right of action in favor of
individuals who, although not themselves
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the victims of gender discrimination, suffer
retaliation because they have complained
about gender discrimination suffered by
others. After review of the text and structure
of the statute, we can discern no
congressional intent in Title IX to create by
implication such a private cause of action.




[The court reviewed de novo the district
court's order granting a motion to dismiss
the complaint.]
B.
According to his complaint, Jackson was
hired by t he Board as a physical education
teacher and girls' basketball coach on or
about August 1993. He was transferred to
Ensley High School in August 1999, where
his duties included coaching the girls'
basketball t eam. While coaching at E nsley,
Jackson came to believe that the girls' team
was denied equal funding and equal access
to sports facilities and equipment. He
complained to his supervisors about the
apparent differential treatment and, shortly
thereafter, he began receiving negative work
evaluations. Jackson was ultimately relieved
of his coaching duties in May 2001, but
remains employed as a tenured physical
education teacher.
We assume for purposes of this appeal that
the Board retaliated against Jackson for
complaining about perceived Title IX
violations. The only question before us
today is whether Title IX provides Jackson a
private right of action and a private remedy
against the Board for its allegedly retaliatory
actions. [Jackson conceded "that Title IX
creates no private rights of action
expressly," but claimed] that such a right is
impliedly created by §§ 901 and 902 of Title
IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-82, in conjunction
with 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e), an anti-retaliation
regulation promulgated by the Department
of Education to enforce Title IX.
Section 901 of Title IX, with certain
exceptions not at issue here, provides that
"[n]o person in the United States shall, on
the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance . . . ." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a).
[Section 902 describes the "elaborate
administrative enforcement scheme for Title
IX" created by Congress and explained by
the Court in Davis v. Monroe County Bd.
of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 638-39, 119 S. Ct.
1661, 1669, 143 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1999).
Federal departments or agencies
"empowered to extend Federal financial
assistance to any education program or
activity" are "authorized and directed to
effectuate the provisions of' § 901 through
regulation. 20 U.S.C. § 1682.] . . . The
primary enforcement mechanism that § 902
gives to agencies is cessation of federal
funding: "[c]ompliance with any
requirement adopted pursuant to this section
may be effected . . . by the termination of or
refusal to grant or to continue
assistance . . . ." Id.
[The court described the procedural
requirements under section 902 that precede
an agency's decision to cut off funding for
an alleged violation of section 901. The
agency must first attempt to obtain voluntary
compliance; next it must hold a hearing to
make an express finding of violation on the
record; finally it must file "a full written
report" with the appropriate House and
Senate legislative committees with
139
jurisdiction over the matter and wait thirty
days after filing the report. Id.]
Using the authority vested in it by § 902, the
Department of Education promulgated 34
C.F.R. § 100.7(e), which prohibits
retaliation against anyone who complains of
a Title IX violation:
No recipient [of federal funds]
or other person shall
intimidate, threaten, coerce,
or discriminate against any
individual for the purpose of
interfering with any right or
privilege secured by section
[901 of Title IX] of the Act
or this part, or because he has
made a complaint, testified,
assisted, or participated in
any manner in an
investigation, proceeding or
hearing under this part.
34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) (emphasis added).
Jackson urges that a private right of a ction
ought to be implied in his favor from the
statute and, more particularly, from 34
C.F.R. § 100.7(e). We are unpersuaded. For
the reasons we make clear below, we hold
that neither Title IX itself nor 34 C.F.R. §
100.7(e) implies a private right of action for
retaliation in Jackson's favor.
C.
Our analysis of Jackson's claim is governed
in substantial measure by the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 121 S. Ct. 1511,
149 L. Ed. 2d 517 (2001), which we
explicate fully for three reasons. First,
Sandoval distills and clarifies the approach
we are obliged to follow in determining
whether to imply a private right of action
from a statute. Second, Sandoval resolved a
claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 ("Title VI"), 78 Stat. 252, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., which
is the model for Title IX and whose
language Title IX copies nearly verbatim.
See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-95, 99 S. Ct. at
1956-57 ("Title IX was patterned after Title
VI . . . . Except for the substitution of the
word 'sex' in Title IX to replace the words
,race, color, or national origin' in Title VI,
the two statutes use identical language to
describe the benefited class.") . . . Because
we therefore read Titles V I and IX in p ari
materia, Sandoval's interpretation of Title
VI p owerfully informs o ur reading o f Title
IX. Third, like Jackson, the plaintiffs in
Sandoval relied on a regulation promulgated
to enforce Title VI as the basis for implying
a private right of action.
In Sandoval, the Supreme Court held that
Title VI does not imply a right of action for
private litigants to sue recipients of federal
funds for "disparate impact" violations. See
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293, 121 S. Ct. at
1523. At issue in Sandoval was the claim
that the Alabama Department of Public
Safety's policy of administering all tests for
drivers' licenses in English only has a
discriminatory effect on racial minorities.
Section 601 of Title VI provides that "[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. §
2000d. Recognizing that Title VI itself
reaches only acts of intentional
discrimination, see Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287, 293, 105 S. Ct. 712, 716, 83 L. Ed.
2d 661 (1985), the plaintiff in Sandoval
alleged that Alabama's restriction violated
28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2), a Department of
Justice regulation promulgated pursuant to §
602 of Title VI, that forbids recipients of
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federal funding from "utiliz[ing] criteria or
methods of administration which have the
effect of subjecting individuals to
discrimination because of their race, color,
or national origin . . . ." 28 C.F.R. §
42.104(b)(2) (1999) (emphasis added).
The Court in Sandoval held that, although a
private cause of action exists to enforce '§
601, see 532 U.S. at 279, 121 S. Ct. at 1516
("private individuals may sue to enforce §
601 of Title VI and obtain both injunctive
relief and damages"), that right plainly does
not extend to the enforcement of disparate
impact regulations promulgated under §602.
See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293, 121 S. Ct. at
1523.
In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court
stressed that legislative intent is the only
basis upon which a private right of action
may be inferred:
Like substantive federal law
itself, private rights of action
to enforce federal law must
be created by Congress. The
judicial task is to interpret the
statute Congress has passed
to determine whether it
displays an intent to create
not just a private right but
also a private remedy.
Statutory intent on this latter
point is determinative.
Without it, a cause of action
does not exist and courts may
not create one, no matter how
desirable that might be as a
policy matter, or how
compatible with the statute.
Raising up causes of action
where a statute has not
created them may be a proper
function for common-law
courts, but not for federal
tribunals.
Id. at 286-87, 121 S. Ct. at 1519-1520
(citations and quotations omitted and
emphasis added)....
Sandoval also clearly delimits the sources
that are relevant to our search for legislative
intent. First and foremost, we look to the
statutory text for "'rights-creating'
language." Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288, 121 S.
Ct. at 1521. .... "Rights-creating language"
is language "explicitly conferr[ing] a right
directly on a class of persons that include[s]
the plaintiff in [a] case," Cannon, 441 U.S.
at 690 n.13, 99 S. Ct. at 1954 n.13, or
language identifying "the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted."
Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33,
39, 36 S. Ct. 482, 484, 60 L. Ed. 874 (1916),
quoted in Cannon, 441 U.S. at 689 n.10, 99
S. Ct. at 1953 n.10. In contrast, "statutory
language customarily found in criminal
statutes . . . and other laws enacted for the
protection of the general public," or a statute
written "simply as a ban on discriminatory
conduct by recipients of federal funds,"
provides "far less reason to infer a private
remedy in favor of individual persons."
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690-93, 99 S. Ct. at
1954-55.
Second, we examine the statutory structure
within which the provision in question is
embedded. If the statutory structure provides
a discernible enforcement mechanism,
Sandoval teaches that we ought not imply a
private right of action because "[t]he express
provision of one method of enforcing a
substantive rule suggests that Congress
intended to preclude others." Sandoval, 532
U.S. at 290, 121 S. Ct. at 1521-22.
Third, if (and only if) statutory text and
structure have not conclusively resolved
whether a private right of a ction should be
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implied, we turn to the legislative history
and context within which a statute was
passed. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288, 121
S. Ct. at 1520. . . .We examine legislative
history with a skeptical eye, because "[t]he
bar for showing legislative intent is high.
'Congressional intent to create a private
right of action will not be presumed. There
must be clear evidence of Congress's intent
to create a cause of action."' McDonald, 291
F.3d at 723 (quoting Baggett v. First Nat'l
Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1345
(11th Cir. 1997)). Moreover, the legislative
history of a statute that is itself unclear about
whether a private right of action is implied is
unlikely to provide much useful
guidance....
Relying exclusively on the text and structure
of Title VI . . . the Court in Sandoval
concluded that Title VI implies no private
right to sue for actions not motivated by
discriminatory intent that result in a
disparate impact. See id. at 293, 121 S. Ct. at
1523. Examining § 601, the Court
determined that it does n ot imply a private
right of action for disparate impact claims,
because, as noted above, "§ 601 prohibits
only intentional discrimination." Id. at 280,
121 S. Ct. at 1516.
The Court turned next to § 602, which, like
§ 902 of Title IX, authorizes federal
agencies " to effectuate the provisions of [§
601] . . . by issuing rules, regulations, or
orders of general applicability." 42 U.S.C. §
2000d-1. The Court concluded that this
provision does not imply a private right of
action. It first observed that 'rights-
creating' language . . . is completely absent
from § 602." Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288, 121
S. Ct. at 1521. Indeed, "[f]ar from
displaying congressional intent to create
new rights, § 602 limits agencies to
'effectuat[ing]' rights already created by §
601." Id. at 289, 121 S. Ct. at 1521 (second
alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Further, the Court noted, . . . the focus of §
602 is twice removed from the individuals
who will ultimately benefit from Title VI's
protection. Statutes that focus on the person
regulated rather than the individuals
protected create "no implication of an intent
to confer rights on a particular class of
persons." Section 602 is yet a step further
removed: it focuses neither on the
individuals protected nor even on the
funding recipients being regulated, but on
the agencies that will do the regulating.
Id. (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451
U.S. 287, 294, 101 S. Ct. 1775, 1779, 68 L.
Ed. 2d 101 (1981)) . . . . The Court thus
concluded that, "[s]o far as we can tell, this
authorizing portion of § 602 reveals no
congressional intent to create a private right
of action." Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289, 121 S.
Ct. at 1521.
The Court also found that "the methods §
602 . . . provide[s] for enforcing its
authorized regulations . .. suggest" an intent
not to create a private right of action. Id.
Section 602 provides for extensive
administrative enforcement, as well as
"elaborate restrictions" of that enforcement,
which "tend[s] to contradict a congressional
intent to create privately enforceable rights
through § 602 itself." Id. at 290, 121 S. Ct.
at 1521. In fact, the Court continued, "[t]he
express provision of one method of
enforcing a substantive rule suggests that
Congress intended to preclude others." Id. at
290, 121 S. Ct. at 1522.
Having determined that § 601 does not
imply a private right of action for disparate
impact claims and that § 602 does not imply
any private right of action at all, the Court
concluded that the regulations promulgated
by agencies with the power granted to them
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by § 602 to enforce the provisions of § 601
also cannot be the basis of an implied
private right of action for disparate impact
claims:
Language in a regulation may
invoke a private right of
action that Congress through
statutory text created, but it
may not create a right that
Congress has not. Thus, when
a statute has provided a
general authorization for
private enforcement of
regulations, it may perhaps
be correct that the intent
displayed in each regulation
can determine whether or not
it is privately enforceable.
But it is most certainly
incorrect to say that language
in a regulation can conjure up
a private cause of action that
has not been authorized by
Congress. Agencies may play
the sorcerer's apprentice but
not the sorcerer himself.
Id. at 291, 121S. Ct. at 1522 (citations and
quotations omitted). . . . Sandoval thus
concluded there is no private right of action
to pursue disparate impact claims under
Title VI.
II.
With this template in front of us, we turn to
Jackson's contention that Title IX, in
conjunction with 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e),
implies a private right of action to remedy
the type of retaliation he claims to have
suffered.
As noted above, Title IX does not expressly
provide any private right of action. . . . In
Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
688-89, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1953, 60 L. Ed. 2d
560 (1979), however, the Supreme Court
held that Title IX implies a private right of
action in favor of direct victims of gender
discrimination. A woman who was denied
admission by two medical schools brought
suit against the schools under Title IX,
alleging that their admissions policies
discriminated against women. Carefully
applying the four-part test set out in Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S. Ct. 2080, 2088,
45 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1975),... the Court found
that Title IX implies a private right of action
"in favor of private victims of
discrimination." Id. at 709, 99 S. Ct. at 1964
(emphasis added). The Court implied this
private right of action in the plaintiffs favor
based, not on § 902 or the regulations
promulgated pursuant to it, but exclusively
on the text, structure, and legislative history
of § 901.
A.
We begin with the text of § 901. . . . Section
901 aims to prevent and redress gender
discrimination and does so by requiring that
"[n]o person in the United States shall, on
the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. §
1681(a); see also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704,
99 S. Ct. at 1961. Nothing in the text
indicates any congressional concern with
retaliation that might be visited on those
who complain of Title IX violations. Indeed,
the statute makes no mention of retaliation
at all. Our task, as Sandoval makes clear, is
to interpret what Congress actually said, not
to guess from congressional silence what it
might have meant. The absence of any
mention of retaliation in Title IX therefore
weighs powerfully against a finding that
Congress intended Title IX to reach
retaliatory conduct. See Litman v. George
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Mason Univ., 156 F. Supp. 2d 579, 584-85
(E.D. Va. 2001) ("Congress was aware that
it could create a right of action for
retaliatory treatment, and it did so in Title
VII; it did not do so in Title IX.").
Section 902 of Title IX ... does not vary our
conclusion that Congress did not intend Title
IX to prohibit retaliation. Section 902, like
its twin § 602, is devoid of "rights-creating"
language of any kind - whether against
gender discrimination, retaliation, or any
other kind of harm. Instead, again like § 602,
it explicitly directs and authorizes federal
agencies to regulate recipients of federal
funding to effectuate the anti-discrimination
provisions of § 901. As detailed above . . . it
provides an enforcement mechanism - the
cessation of federal funding - and imposes
"elaborate restrictions on agency
enforcement." Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 290,
121 S. Ct. at 1521. These restrictions include
requirements that agencies first attempt to
attain voluntary compliance, that agencies
hold a hearing and make express findings of
noncompliance before cutting off funding,
and that agencies provide Congress thirty
days to consider any proposed funding cut
off. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682. That § 902 is thus
concerned exclusively with the power of
federal agencies to regulate recipients of
federal funds renders its focus, like
§602's,"twice removed" from any
consideration of what harm Title IX is
meant to remedy. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289,
121 S. Ct. at 1521. Section 902 plainly does
not disclose any congressional intent to
imply a private right of action of any kind,
let alone against retaliation.
Moreover, as Sandoval teaches, Section
902's provision of an administrative
enforcement mechanism, coupled with §
903's provision of judicial review, strongly
counsels against inferring a private right of
action against retaliation, because "[t]he
express provision of one method of
enforcing a substantive rule suggests that
Congress intended to preclude others."
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 290, 121 S. Ct. at
1521-22.
We conclude, much like the Supreme Court
did in Sandoval, that nothing in the text or
structure of §§ 901 and 902 yields the
conclusion that Congress intended to imply
a private cause of action for retaliation.
While we "have a measure of latitude to
shape a sensible remedial scheme that best
comports with the statute" when
determining the scope of a judicially implied
right and the remedies it makes available,
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524
U.S. 274, 284, 118 S. Ct. 1989, 1996, 141 L.
Ed. 2d 277 (1998), we are not free to craft a
right that there is no evidence Congress
intended to create. See id. . . . Our review of
§§ 901 and 902 unearths absolutely no
indication that Congress intended Title IX to
prevent or redress retaliation. Because the
text thus evinces no concern with retaliation,
we are not free to imply a private right of
action to redress it.
Nor does 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e)'s prohibition
on retaliation . . . imply such a private right
of action or create a private remedy. It is
true, as Jackson asserts, that § 100.7(e)
identifies a class to which it extends its
protection: "any individual" retaliated
against for "complain[ing], testiffying],
assist[ing], or participat[ing] in any manner
in an investigation, proceeding or hearing"
undertaken to enforce Title IX. This
regulatory identification of a protected class
cannot be taken, however, as "rights-
creating," for the simple reason that
"[1]anguage in a regulation . . . may not
create a right that Congress has not."
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291, 121 S. Ct. at
1522. Quite simply, if Congress did not
enact a statute creating a private cause of
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action, we cannot find its intent to do so in
this regulation. Because Congress has not
created a right through Title IX to redress
harms resulting from retaliation, 34 C.F.R. §
100.7(e) may not be read to create one either.
B.
Moreover, even if Title IX did aim to
prevent and remedy retaliation for
complaining about gender discrimination,
Jackson is plainly is not within the class
meant to be protected by Title IX. As
Cannon held, § 901 identifies victims of
gender discrimination as the class it aims to
benefit, and so implies a private right of
action in their favor. Nowhere in the text,
however, is any mention made of
individuals other than victims of gender
discrimination. Gender discrimination
affects not only its direct victims, but also
those who care for, instruct, or are affiliated
with them - parents, teachers, coaches,
friends, significant others, and coworkers.
Congress could easily have provided some
protection or form of relief to these other
interested individuals had it chosen to do so
- especially for a harm as plainly predictable
as the retaliation here at issue - but it did not
do so expressly. Nor does any language in §
902 evince an intent to protect anyone other
than direct victims of gender discrimination.
Indeed, as with § 602 of Title VI, the focus
of § 902 is "twice removed" from victims of
gender discrimination, Sandoval, 532 U.S. at
289, 121 S. Ct. at 1521, and, consequently,
thrice-removed from individuals like
Jackson who are not themselves the victims
of gender discrimination. Here, there is quite
simply no indication of any kind that
Congress meant to extend Title IX's
coverage to individuals other than direct
victims of gender discrimination. We are not
free to extend the scope of Title's IX
protection beyond the boundaries Congress
meant to establish, and we thus may not read
Title IX so broadly as to cover anyone other
than direct victims of gender discrimination.
We thus hold that Title IX does not imply a
private right of action in favor of individuals
who, although not themselves the victims of
gender discrimination, suffer retaliation
because they have complained about gender
discrimination suffered by others.
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Title IX is best known for its impact in
achieving gender equality in college
athletics. But its scope goes beyond athletics
to cover gender discrimination in all kinds
of federally assisted education programs and
activities.
A women's rights group, joined by the U.S.
Department of Justice, is asking the U.S.
Supreme C ourt to review a case that could
expand Title IX even further to protect those
who complain about gender bias but are not
victims themselves.
On Thursday during its private conference,
the Court is scheduled to consider whether
to grant review in dozens of cases including
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education,
No. 02-1672, which was first filed more
than a year ago. At issue is whether Title IX
allows a private right of action for someone
who suffered reprisals for complaining
about unlawful sex discrimination.
The petition was filed by the National
Women's Law Center on behalf of Roderick
Jackson, a girls' high school basketball
coach in Alabama. He sued the Birmingham
Board of Education, alleging that he was
removed in 2001 from his coaching position
in retaliation for c omplaining that h is t eam
was being denied equal funding and equal
access to sports facilities and equipment.
His case was dismissed at the district court
level for failure to state a claim, with the
judge finding that Title IX does not prohibit
retaliation. Jackson appealed, but the 11th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with
the lower court. Judge Stanley Marcus
delivered the I1th Circuit's unanimous
opinion, basing most of the court's judgment
on the Supreme Court's 2001 ruling in
Alexander v. Sandoval. That ruling held that
Title VIofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964 -
which prohibits discrimination by recipients
of federal aid - does not provide an implied
cause of action for cases of disparate impact.
The appeals panel reasoned that under
Sandoval, the Supreme Court would not
possibly entertain a p rivate c laim of illegal
retaliation under Title IX. The 11th Circuit
opinion states also that in the absence of
explicit statutory language, Congress did not
intend Title IX to cover such cases of
retaliation.
Marcia Greenberger, co-president of the
NWLC, filed the petition on behalf Jackson
and has been joined in the case by former
acting Solicitor General Walter Dellinger III,
now with the Washington, D.C. office of
O'Melveny & Myers.
In October, the Court asked the solicitor
general tos tate t he government's views on
the case. In a brief filed last month, Solicitor
General Theodore Olson agreed with the
NWLC, urging the Court to review the case
and to ultimately decide in Jackson's favor.
Title IX, which bans gender discrimination,
does not specify what types of behavior
constitute unlawful discrimination. As a
result, lower courts have had to determine
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what categories of discrimination are within
the scope of Title IX and are therefore
prohibited.
In the 1979 case Cannon v. University of
Chicago, the Supreme Court found that
although Title IX does not explicitly allow a
private right of action, such a right is
implicit for direct victims of gender
discrimination. Otherwise, the Court
reasoned, individual citizens would be
without "effective protection" against
practices made unlawful by Title IX.
But the Court has yet to rule on whether
retaliatory conduct falls into the category of
practices prohibited by Title IX or whether
the law was intended to cover individuals
who were not direct victims of gender
discrimination.
The NWLC argues that the 11th Circuit was
incorrect in its analysis of Title IX.
Although Title IX does not expressly
prohibit retaliation, the NWLC's brief states
that an implied right of action against
retaliation does exist when considering the
"legislative history and context within which
[Title IX] was passed."
Evidence can be found in the congressional
hearings that Congress intended for
retaliation to be prohibited by Title IX, the
brief asserts. "This is not a novel argument,"
says Jocelyn Samuels, vice president for
education and employment at the NWLC.
"In fact, the Court has recognized that other
anti-discrimination statutes inherently
prohibit retaliation."
Moreover, the NWLC claims that, in
addition to Title IX's implied right of action,
an anti-retaliation regulation promulgated by
the Department of Education under the
statute further bolsters its contention.
The U.S. government brief agrees with the
NWLC: "Congress would have understood
that, by prohibiting sex discrimination in
federally funded educational programs, it
was simultaneously forbidding recipients
from retaliating against persons who
complain about that form of discrimination."
The NWLC stresses that the Court should
make room for Jackson on its docket, as the
lower courts are in conflict over the issue.
The issue presented in this case "squarely
divides the federal courts of appeals and is
critical to effective enforcement of Title
IX," writes the NWLC in their petition to
the Supreme Court.
The 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in the
1997 decision in Lowrey v. Texas A&M
University System - a strikingly similar case
- held that the plaintiff, a women's athletic
coordinator who was removed in retaliation
for complaints a bout disparate treatment o f
male and female athletes, did have a cause
of action for retaliation under Title IX.
"[I]ndividuals in the Fifth Circuit may sue
for retaliation under Title IX; those in the
Eleventh Circuit may not," says the NWLC.
"That conflict by itself warrants the court's
intervention."
In its reply brief, lawyers for the
Birmingham Board of Education counter
that the 11th Circuit was correct in its
holding, citing Alexander v. Sandoval as
precedent and binding authority.
"Sandoval established that Title IX, the
statutory twin of Title VI, did not create an
implied right of action that exceeds the
scope of the express statutory right," states
the opposing brief, filed by Kenneth Thomas
of Thomas, Means, Gillis & Seay in
Birmingham, Ala. "Nowhere in the text of
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the statute ist here even a hint that alleged
victims of retaliation ... are also protected."
The brief does not directly respond to the
NWLC's argument that review should be
granted in light of the circuit split over the
issue.
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Gender Equity Case Heads to Top Court: Coach Claims He Lost Job For Whistleblowing
Times-Picayune (Louisiana)
October 9, 2003
Mary Orndorff, Newhouse News Service
WASHINGTON - A high school girls
basketball coach from Birmingham, Ala.,
who says he lost his job after complaining
that the boys teams were getting favorable
treatment is taking a case to the U.S.
Supreme Court that could set a precedent in
gender discrimination law. If the justices
choose to hear the case of Roderick Jackson,
they will be deciding whether someone who
was not a direct victim of sex discrimination
- but allegedly was retaliated against for
pointing it out - can sue in federal court.
Jackson, the former coach at Ensley High
School, so far has lost every legal battle. But
along the way, he gained the attention of the
National Women's Law Center, which is
representing him in a case that could
redefine how the landmark Title IX
education law on gender equity is enforced.
"I wasn't looking to be some great
newsmaker or anything. I just thought it was
a very important point of principle," said
Jackson, a tenured physical education
teacher at Ensley. "The law has certain
guidelines we all have to follow while
implementing equity in sports."
Jackson took the head coaching job in 1999
and noticed a pattern of what he argued was
shabby treatment of the girls team, including
limited gym time, no access to training
equipment and the elimination of the junior
varsity program. He took his complaints to
the school administrators.
By May 2001, after some negative
performance evaluations, he was removed as
coach. Jackson said his confrontations were
with the old administration and that his new
bosses "are headed in the right direction."
He has reapplied for the coaching job and
helped prepare the girls during the pre-
season this fall.
But the issue remains: Does an individual
who is not directly a victim of sex
discrimination have a claim if he believes he
was retaliated against for raising the issue on
someone else's behalf?
"For students, it would be especially
harmful if their teachers or coaches couldn't
raise the issue for them," said Dina Lassow,
senior counsel with the National Women's
Law Center in Washington. "As a coach, he
was the one who clearly saw his team wasn't
getting equal access to the facilities. To say
it's the kids who have to subject themselves
to possible retaliation just doesn't make
sense."
But the Birmingham Board of Education has
argued all along, successfully, that Congress
did not even mention retaliation in Title IX
of the education law on the books since
1972, and judges can't add it now.
"At the end of the day, I think the Supreme
Court is going to have to adhere to what
Congress did," said Kenneth Thomas, a
lawyer for the school board.
Thomas declined to say why Jackson was
fired as coach.
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A Girls' Team, a Fired Coach, and Title IX
The Christian Science Monitor
June 14, 2004
Warren Richey
When coach Roderick Jackson complained
that his girls' basketball team was being
treated like second-class citizens at Ensley
High School in Birmingham, Ala., school
administrators took firm and immediate
action - against Coach Jackson.
"I was told that I was not a team player, that
I needed to play ball or I was going to make
problems for myself," Mr. Jackson says.
"And they weren't joking." He was fired.
Incensed, Jackson filed suit in federal court
under Title IX, which outlaws gender
discrimination in public education. To his
surprise both a federal judge and a federal
appeals court panel threw out his lawsuit
saying the law bans sex discrimination, but
does not cover acts of retaliation against
someone like a coach who fights for what he
or she sees as parity on the playing field.
Monday, the US Supreme Court is expected
to announce whether it will take up
Jackson's case and decide for the entire
nation whether the protections of Title IX
must be applied broadly in a way that would
permit Jackson's suit, or narrowly in a way
that would exclude it.
"If the decision [of the appeals court] is left
to stand and become the law, it really sets a
very bad example and I think would make
people cautious about stepping up to protect
the rights of those who have been
discriminated against," says Walter
Dellinger, a Duke University Law School
professor and former acting US solicitor
general. Mr. Dellinger was hired by the
National Women's Law Center in
Washington to represent Jackson before the
high court.
The case is being closely followed by civil
rights activists who are concerned about the
potential implications of the case on a range
of civil rights laws. If the Supreme Court
adopts a restrictive view of Title IX, it will
make it more difficult for individuals to
fight discrimination.
Others say t he c ase i s important b ecause it
confronts the proper role of judges in
interpreting the 1 aw rather than rewriting it
through expansive rulings.
Kenneth Thomas, who represents the
Birmingham Board of Education, disputes
Jackson's portrayal of the case. "We have a
story to tell, too," Mr. Thomas says. "All of
the facts are not as bad as he has painted
them."
Thomas says that if Jackson loses at the
Supreme Court, those fired for reporting
discrimination will still have recourse to sue
for retaliation. He says other civil rights and
employment discrimination laws cover
retaliatory actions, but Congress never
intended to permit such lawsuits under Title
Ix.
"There is nothing to prevent Congress from
amending Title IX to include an
antiretaliation provision," he notes.
In its decision rejecting Jackson's case, a
three-judge panel of the 11th US Circuit
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Court of Appeals in Atlanta ruled that Title
IX does not permit an individual to sue for
an act of retaliation.
"Gender discrimination affects not only its
direct victims, but also those who care for,
instruct, or are affiliated with them parents,
teachers, coaches, friends, significant others,
and coworkers," writes Circuit Judge
Stanley Marcus for the panel. "Congress
could .easily have provided some protection
or form of relief to these other interested
individuals had it chosen to do so
especially for a harm as plainly predictable
as the retaliation here at issue - but it did not
do so."
Last year, a panel of the Fourth US Circuit
Court of Appeals in Richmond, Va., reached
the opposite conclusion in a similar case. A
Virginia Beach school administrator lost her
job after she complained about racial
discrimination against African-American
students who were excluded from certain
educational programs. The administrator,
who is white, sued the school district for
retaliation related to the racial
discrimination. The appeals court panel
voted 2 to I to allow the suit.
Her suit was filed under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which bars
discrimination based on race. Congress used
identical language in both Title VI and Title
IX. That means that the 11th Circuit and the
Fourth Circuit can't both be correct. If the
high court takes Jackson's case, the justices
must declare which appeals court ruled
correctly.
Marcia Greenberger of the National
Women's Law Center says a ruling against
Jackson would persuade many coaches and
teachers to keep quiet about discrimination.
"I worry a bout a real snowball effect," she
says. "There is a great fear on the part of
many to complain."
Jackson says he went to five different school
administrators about the unequal treatment
of the girls' and boys' basketball teams.
Rather than having access to a newly
constructed gym, the girls' team was
relegated to the old gym with wooden
backboards, bent basketball rims, and no
heat, Jackson says.
The boys' team was able to pay team
expenses from money earned from
admission to games and concession-stand
proceeds. The girls' team was not.
Jackson's complaints came at a price. "I not
only lost the pleasure of coaching, but I lost
the added income and added retirement
income," Jackson says. "I was labeled a
troublemaker and was turned down for other
coaching jobs." But there have been some
developments. Last fall, after 2-1/2 years
away, Jackson was rehired as the acting
girls' basketball coach. The team now





meantime, his team, the Ensley
Jackets, finished 6-2 this season,
a team that won the Alabama
championship.
While Title IX has given rise to
controversies such as that at Ensley High
School, it's also been instrumental in
increasing the profile of women's sports. In
1981-82, 64,000 women participated in
college varsity sports, while 167,000 men
did, according to the National Collegiate
Athletic Association. In 2000-01, the
numbers had changed to 149,000 women
and 207,000 men.
151
High Court Is Rolling Back Implied Private Rights of Action: The Court Refused to




When the U.S. Supreme Court decided
Gonzaga University v. Doe last June, the
case was j ust one o f a flurry of education-
related rulings that closed out the term. It
possessed neither the most colorful facts nor
the weightiest controversy. After all, the
court also ruled on high school drug testing,
private school vouchers and whether
students may be forced to read their grades
aloud.
But no less influential a jurist than Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist confided to a
federal judicial conference in July that
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. 273, was one of the
"sleeper decisions" of 2002.
"What he meant was that the case got little
media coverage when it came down in June,
but it's likely to have great impact in the
future," says University of Southern
California law professor Erwin Chemerinsky.
It is easy to understand the lack of media
coverage. In an opinion joined by four other
justices, Rehnquist said a former student of
Gonzaga University could not invoke
section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
to sue for a violation of a federal educational
privacy law. The school allegedly had
released personal information about the
student to an "unauthorized person" as
defined by the 1974 Federal Educational
Rights and Privacy Act. (Justice Stephen G.
Breyer wrote a separate concurrence, which
was joined by Justice David H. Souter.)
Rehnquist explained that he was merely
clarifying earlier cases that might have
"suggested" a looser standard for
determining when people may use section
1983 to protect their rights under the U.S.
Constitution and other laws.
But, says New York City civil rights lawyer
David Goldberg, "It was less a clarification
than an evisceration of what the court's
precedents had held."
In fact, coupled with a 2001 ruling,
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, which
narrowed the test for finding "implied rights
of action" in federal statutes, the case signals
an intention to substantially curb private
lawsuits on behalf of minorities, the disabled
and beneficiaries of federal entitlements,
Goldberg says.
OPPONENTS ON WATCH
Since Gonzaga, lawyers who support
allowing such private lawsuits, Goldberg
and Chemerinsky among them, have
nervously watched the high court's docket
as petitions have been filed that could give
rise to further restrictions. Opponents of
implied private rights of action and of broad
use of section 1983 to sue for violations of
various other laws have been watching with
eager anticipation.
"It is only a matter of time before any and
all implied private rights of action under any
statute are precluded, whether or not
plaintiffs use section 1983," says Michael
Greve, director of the Washington, D.C.-
based Federalism Project at the American
Enterprise Institute.
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Then, enforcement of federal laws will be
the business solely of government officials,
unless Congress has expressly provided
individuals a right to sue, according to
Greve.
How much time may pass before the justices
speak again is, of course, unknown.
Rehnquist's remarkable touting of the
importance of Gonzaga to the judges
conference confirms the likelihood of
further developments, but it also may signal
a desire to let the lower courts take the lead
for a while, Goldberg believes.
The Rehnquist majority will probably
choose to let the trend simmer a little bit
before attempting another big step, he says.
"I think they'll want to give conservative
lower courts time to operate in the new legal
environment, where defendants will be
claiming that significant circuit court
precedents are no longer binding."
The courts will not lack for chances to limit
litigation rights, Chemerinsky says. He notes
that there are "literally hundreds of federal
laws that do not create express private rights
of action." On the other hand, there are court
decisions stretching back decades that
recognize an individual's right to sue for
injuries caused by violations of those
statutes, either because such a right of action
is implied by the statute, or substantive
rights contained in the statute or regulations
can be protected by section 1983.
Already lower federal circuits have taken up
the gauntlet. In two cases decided last year,
the 11 th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals shot
down implied rights of action in cases
alleging retaliation for a gender bias claim,
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education,
309 F.3d 1333, and discrimination against
an airplane passenger, Love v. Delta
AirLines, 310 EM 1347.
Jackson was brought by a high- school
girls' basketball coach who claimed the
school board fired him because he
complained that the girls' team was denied
equal funding and equal access to sports
facilities. He claimed an implied right of
action under Title IX, which bars sex
discrimination in federally funded
educational programs. He also cited a
federal regulation that bars retaliation for
complaints under Title IX.
Love was brought by a paralyzed woman
who became ill on a flight. She claimed that
Delta Air Lines failed to provide her with an
accessible call button and provided
restrooms that were too small to
accommodate her wheelchair. She sued
under a federal law that prohibits airlines
from discriminating against disabled
individuals.
The 11th Circuit relied on Sandoval in
rejecting the implied rights of action in both
lawsuits.
Writing for a 5-4 majority in Sandoval,
Justice Antonin Scalia squeezed the general
test for finding implied private rights of
action. He wrote that the text of Title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which forbids
discrimination in federally funded programs,
did not clearly authorize lawsuits based on
disparate impacts. Nor could regulations
created under the law create such a right, he
said. The case had been brought by a non-
English speaker who claimed the state of
Alabama's English-only driver's license
exam had a discriminatory disparate impact.
"Like substantive federal law i tself, private
rights of action to enforce federal law must
be created by Congress," Scalia wrote.
"Neither as originally enacted nor as later
amended does Title VI display an intent to
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create a freestanding private right of action
to enforce regulations promulgated under
[the Civil Rights Act]." Congressional intent
to permit private lawsuits must be evident in
the text and structure of the statute, not
merely in the "expectations" of the enacting
Congress, Scalia said.
Gonzaga applies Sandoval's narrow
approach when identifying which
substantive rights may be protected by
private lawsuits under section 1983. In
either situation, a plaintiff "must show that
the statute manifests an intent 'to create not
just a private right but also a private
remedy,' " Rehnquist wrote, quoting from
Sandoval.
Rebecca Epstein of Washington, D.C.-based
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice knows
about the fallout from the high court cases.
When Sandoval was decided, Epstein was
litigating a disparate impact case in
Michigan. Her clients allege that Michigan's
use of standardized tests to select
scholarship students keeps a
disproportionate number of minority
students from receiving assistance.
"Sandoval abruptly reversed nearly three
decades of Title VI precedent that allowed
such lawsuits," she says. "We had to change
our claim to use section 1983." This
followed the advice of Justice John Paul
Stevens, who in his dissenting opinion in
Sandoval said that implied rights of.action
against state actors could simply be replaced
by a section 1983 civil rights claim.
U.S. District Judge Patrick Duggan allowed
the section 1983 claim in an opinion issued
in November 2001, before the supreme court
decided Gonzaga. White v. Engler, 188 F.
Supp. 2d 730 (E.D. Mich.). Other courts,
though, have held that a federal regulation
alone may not create a right enforceable
through section 1983. Epstein breathed a
sigh of relief when Michigan did not pounce
on the Gonzaga ruling to support a new
motion to dismiss.
Greve says that the media will notice the
"anti-entitlement federalism" trend
represented by Sandoval and Gonzaga as
soon as it affects a major welfare program.
He had high hopes last fall that the
"federalist five" justices would move to curb
private lawsuits under "the mother of all
entitlement programs, M edicaid." The state
of Michigan was seeking review of Westside
Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852, which
allowed a welfare rights group to sue under
section 1983 to correct alleged defects in the
state's Medicaid-mandated preventive health
program for children. The 6th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals had decided the case just
before the Gonzaga decision.
Despite the denial of cert, civil rights
advocates like Goldberg were not
celebrating. Even if the justices do not
address the issue of private rights of action
this term, decisions like Westside Mothers
"are very much on conservative jurists'
radar screen," he says. Future cases are
likely to raise the same issues, Goldberg
says.
He notes that supreme court justices rarely
wish to attract lots of public attention. In
that light, it would seem no accident that the
audience for Rehnquist's "sleeper" comment
about Gonzaga was a group of judges, not a
group of reporters.
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Garrison S. Johnson v. James Gomez, et al.
(03-636)
Ruling Below: (Johnson v. State of California, 321 F.3d 791, 3 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1573, 2003
Daily Journal D.A.R. 2051 (9th Cir.(Cal.) Feb 25, 2003) (NO. 01-56436) Rehearing and
Rehearing en Banc Denied, 336 F.3d 1117, 3 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6629, 2003 Daily Journal
D.A.R. 8295 (9th Cir. Jul 28, 2003) (NO. 01-56436), Cert. Granted, 124 S.Ct. 1505, 158
L.Ed.2d 151, 4 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1730 (U.S. Mar 01, 2004) (NO. 03-636)).
The Ninth Circuit held that the California Department of Corrections' ("CDC's") use of race as a
dominant factor in assigning new prison inmates to temporary cell mates for a 60 day
observation period did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Rather than relying on the
traditional strict scrutiny analysis in determining whether the plaintiff s constitutional rights were
violated, the Ninth Circuit applied a relaxed standard ofreview applicable to prison i nmates,
described by Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78. To prevail under the first prong of this test, it is the
inmate's burden of proving that the alleged constitutional abuse is not "reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests." If the inmate rebuts the existence of a common sense
connection between the use of race and the legitimate penological interest, the burden shifts to
the state to show that the use of race was not irrational. The Ninth Circuit found that Johnson did
not produce evidence sufficient to rebut that the CDC's use of racial segregation was reasonably
related to the legitimate goal of preventing racially-motivated violence by inmates.
Question Presented: Whether routine racial segregation in temporary prison cell mate housing
assignments used to prevent inter-racial violence between new inmates violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and whether such segregation is subject to a
more relaxed standard of judicial review under Turner v. Safley.
GARRISON S. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant
V.
State of California; JAMES H. GOMEZ, Director, Department of Corrections;
James Rowland, Defendants-Appellees
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit
Decided February 25, 2003
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge: We must decide whether a prison reception
center housing policy, which uses race as
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one factor in assigning a new inmate's initial
cell mate for 60 days, violates the Equal
Protection Clause.
I
Garrison Johnson is an African-American
prisoner in the California Department of
Corrections ("CDC"), serving his sentence
for murder, robbery, and assault with a
deadly weapon. On June 22, 1987, he was
received at the California Institution for Men
in Chino, California . . . [h]e has been
through the inmate reception centers at
Chino, Folsom, Calipatria. . . . At each
facility he was double-celled with another
African-American inmate.
According to the staff testimony in the
record, when an inmate arrives at a CDC
institution either as a transfer from another
facility or as a new inmate, he . .. is initially
housed in a reception center. At the
reception center, the inmate goes through a
classification process. The CDC evaluates
the inmate's physical, mental, and emotional
health. The inmate must also provide
vocational and educational goals that he
wants to accomplish while incarcerated.
Finally, the inmate is given a battery of tests.
In making its decision, the CDC reviews the
inmate's history in jail and any previous
commitments to determine his security
needs and classification level. The CDC also
looks to see if the inmate has any enemies in
the prison, such as people who testified
against him in the past or in his criminal
case, co-defendants, or inmates with whom
he may have had disputes during previous
incarcerations.
To determine the double-cell housing
placement at the reception center, the CDC
looks at several factors including, but not
limited to, gender, age, classification score,
case concerns, custody concerns, mental and
physical health, enemy situations, gang
affiliation, background, history, custody
designation, and race. Although race is only
one of many factors, it is a dominant factor;
according to the CDC, the chances of an
inmate being assigned a cell mate of another
race is "[p]retty close" to zero percent. The
CDC considers race when making an initial
housing assignment because, in its
experience, race is very important to inmates
and it plays a significant role in antisocial
behavior.
Generally, inmates are listed in four general
ethnic categories, black, white, Asian, and
other. Within each of these categories,
officials at the reception center further
divide inmates, for example Japanese and
Chinese inmates are generally not housed
together, nor are Laotians, Vietnamese,
Cambodians, and Filipinos. Also, Hispanics
from Northern California and Hispanics
from Southern California are not housed
together because, in the administrators'
experience, they tend to be at odds with one
another.
[Prison officials unanimously agree that
disregarding race in initial housing
assignments would put new inmates at risk
for suffering racially-motivated violence.]
Although the rest of the prison is fully
integrated-there is no distinction based on
race as to jobs, meals, yard and recreation
time, and vocational and educational
assignments-according to the administrators,
the confined nature of the cells makes them
different from the other areas of the prison.
Staff cannot see into the cells without going
up to them, and inmates are capable of
placing coverings over the windows so that
staff cannot see in them at all. Moreover,
inmates are confined to their cells for much
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of their day. Because of the current levels of
racial violence occurring in areas where the
staff can easily observe the inmates, the
administrators are concerned that they
would not be able to protect inmates who are
confined in their cells. Thus, the
administrators argue that they need 60 days
to analyze each inmate on an individual
basis to determine whether the inmate poses
a danger to others.
After 60 days, the inmate either is assigned a
cell within the current institution where he
will be permanently housed or is transferred
to another institution where his classification
indicates that he would be more suited. If
the inmate is transferred, he again goes
through the initial housing screening process.
If the inmate stays at the institution and has
the appropriate security classification, he
may be transferred to a dormitory or a single
cell.
Inmates assigned to a dormitory are
considered nonviolent, and, thus, inmates of
all races are housed together. The CDC does
not use race as a factor to determine who is
assigned to a dormitory, but within each
dormitory it attempts to maintain a racial
balance so as to reduce the likelihood of
racial violence. Single-cell housing
decisions are made completely independent
from race. Johnson does not allege that
either of these two housing policies violate
equal protection.
If the inmate remains in a double cell, the
CDC's goal is for inmates to select their
own cell mate, so as to maximize the
inmates' compatibility and to reduce the
possibility of violence. There are designated
forms that both inmates must sign indicating
that they would like to share a cell together.
Unless there are security reasons for not
granting an inmate's request to share a cell
with another inmate, the CDC will usually
grant these requests. Race is not a
consideration in such decisions.
II
[Johnson filed the original complaint pro se
in 1995. In 1998, the district court dismissed
the suit after a third amended complaint, but
the Ninth Circuit remanded on Johnson's
appeal in 2000, "holding that Johnson's
allegations were 'sufficient to state a claim
for racial discrimination in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' Johnson v. California, 207
F.3d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 2000).]
On remand, Johnson was appointed
counsel . . . [H]is Fourth Amended
Complaint . . . [sought] monetary damages
[and injunctive relief]. He alleged that James
Gomez and James Rowland, former CDC
Directors, in their individual capacities
violated his constitutional rights by
formulating and implementing the CDC
housing policy....
[The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the administrators'
based on qualified immunity, holding that
under Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121
S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001),] the
former administrators were entitled to
qualified immunity because their actions
were not clearly unconstitutional. Johnson
now appeals from the district court's grant
of summary judgment for the administrators.
III
The Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272
(2001), instructed that before we can
determine whether state officials are entitled
to qualified immunity, we must first address
the merits of the alleged constitutional
violation. [The court determined that it must
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address Johnson's Constitutional claim on
the merits.]
A
Johnson alleges that the state's use of race in
making initial housing assignments
constitutes an impermissible racial
classification afoul of the Equal Protection
Clause. [Because the state admits
considering race when it assigns inmates
their cell mate . .. the policy is suspect on its
face, and Johnson need not prove a
discriminatory intent or impact. See Regents
of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289
n. 27, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978)].
The Equal Protection Clause provides that
"[n]o State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The
central mandate of this Clause "is racial
neutrality in governmental decisionmaking."
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904, 115
S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995)....
[The Supreme Court in Lee v. Washington,
390 U.S. 333, 88 S.Ct. 994, 19 L.Ed.2d
1212 (1968) held that an Alabama state
statute requiring segregated cell blocks in
jails and prisons violated the Equal
Protection Clause. It also] recognized that
prisons present an inherently different
situation than society at large . .. [and] that
"prison authorities have the right, acting in
good faith and in particularized
circumstances, to take into account racial
tensions in maintaining security, d iscipline,
and good order in prisons a nd j ails." Id. at
334, 88 S.Ct. 994. . . . Thus, while
recognizing the important need to combat
racial discrimination, even in prisons, the
Court also recognized that the very nature of
prisons may require the use of race-based
criteria in official decisionmaking under
limited circumstances.
Johnson does not dispute that Lee
acknowledges that under some
circumstances race may be considered in
prison decisionmaking, but denies that this
is one such instance. [The court
distinguished cases cited by Johnson to
support a finding that segregation in prison
housing assignments is unconstitutional.
Unlike in the cited cases, the CDC is fully
integrated, and the segregation occurs only
as a temporary arrangement which,
"according to the CDC, permits it to learn
more about the inmates before assigning
them to a cell on a more permanent basis."]
In this case, to run a safe prison system, the
CDC contends that it must assign cell mates,
partly based on the inmates' race, for 60
days so that it can find out more about the
inmate and reduce violence within the prison
system. The policy is limited to the dangers
it seeks to alleviate.
Paramount, in this case, there is also no
indication that the use of race in the CDC's
decisionmaking disparately affects the
inmates. . . . [Unlike other precedents,]
disparate treatment is not present in this case:
there are no allegations that African-
American inmates receive unfavorable cell
locations or disparate treatment as compared
to their white or Hispanic counterparts. ...
[Johnson relied upon cases decided before
the Supreme Court's "new deferential test
for examining the constitutional rights of
prisoners," described in Turner v. Safely,
482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d
(1987). Although the "invidious and
pervasive nature of the segregation in those
cases probably have been invalidated under
Turner, the court noted that "in a close case
such as the one at hand . . . the standard of
review is paramount."]
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BTurner recognized that "courts are ill
equipped to deal with the increasingly
urgent problems of prison administration
and reform," and that "the problems of
prisons in America are complex and
intractable, and, more to the point, they are
not readily susceptible of resolution by
decree." 482 U.S. at 84, 107 S.Ct. 2254
(citation and internal quotations omitted)....
Thus, "when a prison regulation impinges
on inmates' constitutional rights, the
regulation is valid if it is reasonably related
to legitimate penological interests." Id. at 89,
107 S.Ct. 2254.
[The court described the difficulty to the
inmate of proving a prison regulation
unconstutional under Turner. To prevail, the
inmate bears a 'heavy burden' of
overcoming "the presumption that the prison
officials acted within their 'broad
discretion."' Shaw, 532 U.S. at 232, 121
S.Ct. 1475.] With Turner as our guide, we
now consider whether the administrators'
temporary housing policy is reasonably
related to their c oncern for increased racial
violence.
IV
In Turner, the Court provided four factors to
examine in determining whether the prison
administrators' actions are reasonably
related to a legitimate penological interest.
First, a " 'valid, rational c onnection' [must
exist] between the prison regulation and the
legitimate governmental interest put forward
to justify it." Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107
S.Ct. 2254 (quoting Block v. Rutherford,
468 U.S. 576, 586, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 82
L.Ed.2d 438 (1984)). Second, we must
determine "alternative means of exercising
the right that remain open to prison
inmates." Id. Third, we must assess "the
impact accommodation of the asserted
constitutional right will have on guards and
other inmates, and on the allocation of
prison resources generally." Id. Fourth, we
must determine whether "ready alternatives"
to the CDC's policy are available. Id. The
"existence of obvious, easy alternatives may
be evidence that the regulation is not
reasonable." Id.
A
[The court first analyzed whether there was
a "legitimate" and "neutral" governmental
objective underlying the policy at issue and
whether the policy is 'rationally related to
that objective' Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d
1054, 1059 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc)
(quoting Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S.
401, 414, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459
(1989)).The court found that the
governmental objective of reducing racially-
motivated violence was both legitimate and
neutral, since "the housing policy does not
provide any advantage or disadvantage to
any particular race, and the objective,
reducing violence among the inmates and
against the staff, has nothing to do with race,
but rather with inmate and staff safety." The
court then determined that the housing plan
was "rationally related to the state's
interest." The court rejected Johnson's
argument that the prison must first document
an instance of racial violence "specific to
cell assignments" before it could rationally
craft a policy to pre-empt such violence
because such analysis "cannot withstand our
consistent application of Turner. See, e.g.,
Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516 (9th Cir.1993)].
[The court recounted the "well-documented"
history of racially-motivated violence in
CDC, citing numerous race riots between
Northern and Southern hispanics, white
supremacists, and blacks in the past decade,
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which threatened prison security and caused
lockdowns, injury of numerous inmates and
the deaths of several others. The court
concluded: "this is hardly a case where the
prison administrators are acting on an
unsubstantiated record."]
[The court affirmed Johnson's burden of
production post-Turner, citing Frost v.
Symington, 197 F.3d 348, 357 (9th Cir.
1999). The court explained that if an inmate
presents "sufficient (pre or post) trial
evidence that refutes a common-sense
connection between a legitimate objective
and a prison regulation," . . . then the
administrators bear the burden of proving
that the "connection is not so 'remote as to
render the policy arbitrary or irrational."'
[I]d. (quoting Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d
1054, 1060 (9th Cir.1999)).]
Given the admittedly high racial tensions
and violence already existing within the
CDC, there is clearly a common-sense
connection between the use of race as the
predominant factor in assigning cell mates
for 60 days until it is clear how the inmate
will adjust to his new environment and
reducing racial violence and maintaining a
safer environment .....
[Johnson made two arguments to rebut the
common sense connection, namely: "that the
high levels of racial violence are evidence
that the CDC's housing policy does not
work... and that some gangs are not formed
strictly along racial lines." The court
responded to these arguments noting that]
administrators do not contend that their
housing policy i s a magical elixir designed
to cure all the racial and gang tensions
within the prison; they contend only that
without their policy, racial violence, both
within the cells and in the recreation areas,
would increase. Johnson has failed to offer
any evidence to refute this connection. Just
because racial violence already exists does
not mean that pre-existing policies do not
work to reduce that violence from being
even more pervasive than it already is....
Because Johnson failed to refute the
common-sense connection between the
policy and prison violence, the "government
was not required to make any evidentiary
showing concerning the c onnection." Frost,
197 F.3d at 357.... [The court concluded it
was "plausible, given the racial violence and
tensions already present in the CDC and the
knowledge that in other prison settings race-
blind housing assignments have caused
violence, that the administrators believe
using race as one factor in making an initial
housing determination is necessary for
inmate and staff safety" and found that
"Turner's first prong has been met."]
B
[The court then considered the second
factor under Turner, "whether alternative
means of exercising the right remain open to
prison inmates." The court noted the
deference due to corrections officials when
other avenues for exercising constitutional
rights exist, consistent with Mauro, 188 F.3d
at 1061. It then examined Johnson's right
"expansively and sensibly" under Abbott,
490 U.S. at 417, 109 S.Ct. 1874,
"considering "Johnson's right to be free
from state-sponsored racial discrimination at
a macro level." It noted several precedents
in which no impermissible discrimination
occurred although particular rights were
denied, because in those cases access to a
more general right was preserved. The court
concluded that "the correct analysis in this
case is not whether the state has provided
reasonable alternatives from the CDC's use
of race as a factor for the first 60 days, but
whether the state has provided reasonable
alternatives from racial discrimination in
general." Applied to this case, because the
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policy lasts only temporarily, because there
are no " black" cells or " white" c ells. . a nd
because "the remainder of the prison is
integrated in full without regard to race" the
court concluded that Johnson had
"reasonable alternatives to exercise [his]
constitutional rights.]
C
The third Turner factor requires us to
examine what impact accommodating the
inmate's asserted right will have on prison
personnel, inmates, and the allocation of
prison resources. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90, 107
S.Ct. 2254. The CDC administrators contend
that failing to consider race in making initial
housing assignments would lead to
increased racial violence both in the cells
and in the common areas. The impact would
be significant, jeopardizing the safety of all
the inmates and prison staff. Johnson,
however, contends that the administrators
failed to proffer evidence that not using race
as a factor would cause a strain on prison
resources. Again, Johnson misconstrues
Turner. The CDC does not have to prove
that eliminating their policy would impact (1)
prison personnel, (2) inmates, and (3) prison
resources; rather, Johnson must prove that
eliminating the CDC's housing policy would
not affect one of these areas in a sufficient
manner. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 227, 110
S.Ct. 1028. Johnson has failed to do so.
[The court noted both that "Johnson did not
rebut the CDC's claim that racial violence
would occur both in cells and in the
recreation areas if the CDC did not take race
into account" and that "[t]he administrators,
moreover, affirmatively proffered evidence
to show that inmate and guard safety would
be compromised." The court then recounted
the CDC's evidence that without
consideration of race in housing assignments,
racial violence would exist within cells and
escalate within common areas. The court
concluded that "[w]ithout contrary evidence
that the accommodation of the inmates'
rights would not affect inmate and staff
safety, we must defer to the judgment of the
administrators."]
D
The fourth factor we must examine is
whether reasonable alternatives to using race
as a factor in the initial housing policy
would "fully accommodate[ ] the prisoner's
rights at de minimis cost to valid
penological interests...." Turner, 482 U.S. at
91, 107 S.Ct. 2254. This is not a "least
restrictive alternative test"; it is a
reasonableness test. Thus, while the
regulation need not be a perfect fit to the
solution at hand, it cannot be an
"exaggerated response." Id. at 90, 107 S.Ct.
2254. "[T]he absence of ready alternatives is
evidence of the reasonableness of a prison
regulation. By the same token, the existence
of obvious, easy alternatives may be
evidence that the regulation is not
reasonable, but is an 'exaggerated response'
to prison concerns." Id. "The burden is on
the prisoner challenging the regulation, not
on the prison officials, to show that there are
obvious, easy alternatives to the regulation."
Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1062.
[Johnson offered two alternatives] . . .
[O]fficials could screen inmates (1) on the
basis of professed gang affiliation or (2) by
examining the inmates' racial animus or a
history of interracial violence. [The court
assessed the alternatives.] There is little
chance that inmates will be forthcoming
about their past violent episodes or criminal
gang activity so as to provide an accurate
and dependable picture of the inmate. . . .
Requesting that inmates provide potentially
self-incriminating information themselves...
does not provide sufficiently reliable data
under which the CDC could make a
meaningful decision. Without a guarantee of
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the veracity of the information, Johnson's
argument does not provide a reasonable
alternative. [The court then found that the
second alternative, an independent
evaluation of an inmate's past, would be
unreasonable b ecause t here i s no guarantee
of accuracy. The court finally noted that
under Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1062, Johnson
could not prevail "[w]ithout some sort of
showing that the CDC could accomplish its
goals without incurring a significant cost."]
Our decision that the CDC policy is not an
"exaggerated response" is reinforced when
we look to our Eighth Amendment Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause
jurisprudence. Prison authorities are
required under the Eighth Amendment to
"take reasonable measures to guarantee the
safety of the inmates." Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128
L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (internal citations and
quotations omitted); Harper, 494 U.S. at 223,
110 S.Ct. 1028....
[T]he failure to take race into consideration
in cell assignments could be considered
"deliberate indifference" to prisoners' safety
and could itself constitute a constitutional
violation. [The court noted supportive
testimony]. To reduce its liability under the
Eighth Amendment and to protect inmates,
the CDC crafted a policy, assigning cell
mates largely along racial lines for a limited
time, so as to decrease the risk of racial
violence that the administrators are aware
exists. Certainly, this is a reasonable
response in light of the conflicting
responsibilities that the CDC must balance.
V
Although there may be many ways in which
to achieve the state's objective in reducing
racial violence in the CDC, the path chosen
by the State of California is reasonably
related to the administrators' concern for
racial violence and thus must be upheld. If
this policy were implemented beyond the
prison w alls, undoubtedly, we would strike
it down as unconstitutional. The prison
system, however, is inherently different and
we must defer our judgment to that of the
prison administrators until presented
evidence demonstrating the
unreasonableness of the administrators'
policy. The Supreme Court has instructed us
that inmates bear a "heavy burden" to show
that prison officials acted unconstitutionally,
and in this case, Johnson failed to carry his
burden. He presented little to no evidence
and could not rebut the presumption of
constitutionality that the administrators are
afforded.
Because Johnson failed to prove that a
constitutional violation could be made out,
we need not reach the u Itimate question of
whether the CDC administrators are entitled
to qualified immunity. Saucier, 533 U.S. at
201, 121 S.Ct. 2151.
AFFIRMED.
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Justices Agree To Evaluate Prison Policy Based on Race
The New York Times
March 2, 2004
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to hear
a challenge to a California prison system
policy that segregates inmates by race
during their first 60 days of incarceration.
The state has defended the policy, and a
federal appeals court has upheld it, as a
sensible way to minimize interracial
violence at the reception centers where
inmates are housed while being screened for
long-term placement. One purpose of the
screening is to assess a new inmate's
potential for violence.
During this 60-day period, inmates are
assigned to two-person cells based on
whether they are black, white, Asian or
"other." Within those categories, the
authorities also separate some by national or
geographic origin. For example, Japanese
and Chinese inmates are not housed together,
neither are Laotians and Vietnamese, or
Hispanics from Northern and Southern
California.
The segregation policy is also used for the
first 60 days after an inmate is transferred
from one prison to another. In all instances,
however, areas of the prison other than the
actual cells - the yard, dining hall and work
and recreation areas - are not segregated.
The policy has been in effect for more than
25 years. Garrison S. Johnson, a black
inmate convicted of murder, challenged it in
1997 by filing a federal lawsuit that he
drafted himself. The lower federal courts
dismissed the suit while permitting him to
amend it with a lawyer's help. Proskauer
Rose, a New York law firm with an office in
Los Angeles, has been handling the case
without charge for the past three years.
In the amended lawsuit, both the Federal
District Court in Los Angeles and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
in San Francisco, upheld the policy. In its
ruling in February 2003, the Ninth Circuit
said there was "clearly a common-sense
connection" between using race for the
initial assignment and reducing racial
violence in the prison system.
"The housing policy does not provide any
advantage or disadvantage to any particular
race, and the objective, reducing violence
among the inmates and against the staff, has
nothing to do with race, but rather with
inmate and staff safety," Judge Diarmuid F.
O'Scannlain wrote for a three-judge panel of
the appeals court.
In the Supreme Court appeal, Johnson v.
Gomez, No. 03-636, Mr. Johnson's lawyers
argue that the Ninth Circuit applied the
wrong legal standard, and that a government
policy that makes distinctions on the basis of
race has to meet a more searching test than
that of common sense or reasonableness. All
such policies are presumptively
unconstitutional, they said.
"The decision below undermines a national
imperative to eliminate racial
discrimination," the appeal argues. It adds
that though segregating inmates by race
might be justified in response to an
"extraordinary circumstance involving
prison security," it should not be a routine
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part of administering a prison system with
100,000 inmates.
A Supreme Court decision in 1968, Lee v.
Washington, prohibited segregation in the
Alabama prison system. Though Mr.
Johnson's lawyers invoked that precedent,
the Ninth Circuit disregarded it on the
ground that the court in 1968 was addressing
a policy that permanently segregated the
prison population into whites-only and
blacks-only cellblocks. The California
policy, by contrast, imposes only short-term
segregation and "is limited to the dangers it
seeks to alleviate," the appeals court said.
Rather than the "strict scrutiny" usually
applied in race discrimination cases, the
Ninth Circuit applied a more relaxed
standard of review derived from a prison
regulation case the Supreme Court decided
in 1987. The decision in that case, Turner v.
Safley, said that courts should generally
uphold prison regulations that are
''reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest." The connection
between the regulation and the
administrators' goal in issuing it must be a
valid and rational one, the court said in that
case.
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The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to
hear a constitutional challenge to
California's policy of segregating new
prisoners by race.
For the first 60 days, a new inmate is kept in
a cell with another inmate of the same race,
in what state officials say is an effort to
reduce violence. Skinheads or members of
black and Latino gangs are more likely to
get into fights if they are housed with
someone of another race, the officials say.
The new prisoners are evaluated for their
potential for violence, and after 60 days they
are assigned to a permanent cell - without
regard to their race.
The segregation policy was challenged by
Garrison Johnson, a black inmate, who
contended that "intentional state racial
segregation" violates the Constitution and its
guarantee of equal protection of the laws. He
lost before a federal judge and the U.S. 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals, but the Supreme
Court voted to take up his claim.
Since the Brown vs. Board of Education
decision in 1954, in which the Supreme
Court rejected the notion of "separate but
equal" in public education, the high court
has frowned upon nearly all government
policies or practices that mandate
segregation by race. However, judges have
upheld moves by prison officials to separate
black and white inmates in response to
rioting or fighting.
Lawyers for Garrison say this emergency
exception is not enough to justify routine
racial segregation.
"Over 100,000 California inmates are
subject to admittedly segregationist
government policies," they wrote in their
petition to the court. "Given the history of
stigma and racial discrimination that such
segregation calls to mind," the court should
forbid the routine practice of relying on race
as a means to separate prisoners, they said.
In their reply, the state's lawyers stressed the
initial "classification" period is temporary,
and said it does not result in different or
unfair treatment of inmates. Moreover, the
inmates are "fully integrated" during the day
when they are at work, at meals and in the
yards for recreation.
The Supreme Court will hear the case of
Johnson vs. Gomez in the fall.
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U.S. Supreme Court to Review California Prison Cell Segregation
The San Diego Daily Transcript
April 30, 2004
Anne Gearan, Associated Press
Washington - Fifty years after the Supreme
Court declared racial segregation
unconstitutional in public schools, the court
agreed Monday to consider whether state
prisons may separate new inmates by race as
a safety measure.
California routinely assigns newly arrived
black prisoners to bunk only with other
black prisoners for three months or more,
and likewise assigns white and Asian
inmates to cells with others of their race or
ethnicity.
A black prison inmate challenged the
practice as a violation of his constitutional
right to equal treatment. Garrison S. Johnson
also argued the policy flouts previous
Supreme Court rulings striking down
segregation in other areas.
"Intentional state racial segregation has been
outlawed in this country for over half a
century," Johnson's lawyers argued in
asking the Supreme Court to hear his appeal.
Prison officials say housing inmates by race
helps keep prisoners safe from racial
violence, and note that wardens also look at
factors such as an inmate's age and health in
deciding who rooms with whom.
Segregation is temporary, California
Attorney General Bill Lockyer told the
Supreme Court in a court filing, and the
policy applies only to the two-person cells in
which inmates are housed when they first
enter the prison system or when they are
transferred from one prison to another.
The rest of the prison system is not
segregated, and inmates are often allowed to
eventually choose their cellmates without
regard to race, the state said. The California
prison system, with more than 300,000
inmates, is the nation's largest.
"The confined nature of the cells makes
them potentially more dangerous than the
other areas of the prison," Lockyer wrote in
asking the Supreme Court not to hear
Johnson's appeal.
Racial violence is a problem in prison areas
outside inmate cells, Lockyer said.
"Administrators are concerned they would
not be able to protect inmates who are
confined in their cells, if they did not
consider race as a factor."
The practice dates back more than 25 years,
Johnson said. Johnson is serving a sentence
for murder, robbery and assault. He was
segregated by race upon entering the prison
system in 1987, and has been similarly
segregated each time he transferred to a new
prison, his lawyers said.
The San Francisco-based 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled against Johnson last
year.
Prison officials had sound reasons to want to
separate inmates by race, and did not treat
one race better than another, the appeals
judges said.
"The housing policy does not provide an
advantage or disadvantage to any particular
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race, and the objective reducing violence
among inmates and against the staff has
nothing to do with race," the appeals court
said.
This year marks the 50th anniversary of the
Supreme Court's landmark Brown v. Board
of Education, which outlawed racial
segregation in public schools. Similar
rulings followed, including a 1968 case that
prohibited blanket racial segregation in state
prisons. The court said, however, that in the
interest of security, prison officials could
take racial tensions into account on a case-
by-case basis.
The high court will hear the latest case next
fall, with a ruling expected by July 2005.
The case is Johnson v. California, 03-636.
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Syracuse U.: Syracuse Grad, Cell Mate Challenge Prison Housing
Daily Orange (Syracuse U.)
April 16, 2004
Erin Dejesus
SYRACUSE, N.Y. - Viet Mike Ngo, former
cellmate of Syracuse University graduate
Stephen Liebb, who is currently serving
time in a California prison, filed a habeas
corpus petition March 30 to a California
Supreme Court, claiming that his rooming
assignment within the racial classification
system of inmates puts him in danger.
Liebb, 57, is serving a 25-year to life
sentence in a California prison for first-
degree murder and filed his own habeas
corpus petition last September on a similar
claim, requesting a change in his racial
classification from "white" to "other."
Liebb, an Orthodox Jew, and Ngo, who
identifies as Jewish, claim that for Jewish
people to be classified as white forces them
to live with white supremacists or Neo-
Nazis, said Liebb in a Jewish Journal of
Greater Los Angeles article. The "white"
category includes more anti-Semites than
any other category.
Liebb, who earned a law degree law at the
University of California-Los Angeles after
graduating from SU, was convicted of first-
degree murder in Santa Monica in 1981. He
served 21 years in various prisons and has
spent the past eight years in the San Quentin
prison, California's oldest correctional
facility.
The prison separates prisoners into four
racial categories - white, black, Hispanic
and an "other" category, which includes
Asians and Native Americans. The prison
uses the classifications as a way to
determine rooming assignments and help
control lockdown situations.
Within the California prison system, 29
percent of inmates are white, 29 percent
black, 36 percent Hispanic and 6 percent fall
into the "other" category, according to the
California Department of Corrections.
Prisoners in New York state, however, do
not undergo racial segregation.
"We don't segregate based on race or age,
only gender," said Linda Foglia of the
Department of Correctional Services in
Albany. The New York state department
classifies prisoners before they reach
individual state facilities by other factors
such as security level and state of mental
health.
A white classification of Jewish people adds
to an already hostile prison environment,
said Charles Carbone, a lawyer at California
Prison Focus, an organization that works to
stop human rights violations within
California state prisons.
"Prisons are one of the most racially
unfriendly environments in the country,"
Carbone said. "It's especially difficult for
Jewish prisoners who are seen as white, but
due to their history and culture, they're
obviously non-white."
It is too soon to predict the outcome of the
suit, said Carbone, whose organization has
represented other inmates with similar
complaints. But if successful, Liebb's suit
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could severely challenge the way cultural
definitions are assigned in prisons.
"If it's a victorious case, it will definitely
have a precedence in the California court
system," Carbone said. "Counting other
prison systems, which typically learn by
watching, it will have a far-reaching effect
in judicial prejudices."
But an appeal to classify Jews into a
separate race is unlikely because society as a
whole does not recognize Jewish people as
within a non-white race, said Zachary
Braiterman, an associate professor of Judaic
studies at SU.
"I can't even imagine it, frankly, because
it's such ao Id way ofthinking a bout Je ws
and Judaism," Braiterman said. "Before the
Holocaust, Jews were considered a race.
After [World War II], I don't think anyone
considered the Jews constituted a separate






The definition of Judaism became more of a
religious, cultural identity, rather than a
racial identity, after World War II,
Braiterman said.
The practice of racial segregation within
prisons also is legal, and to many, is the
easiest way to promote safety within prisons,
Carbone said.
"They realize inmates segregate themselves
according to race," Carbone said.
"Institutions have a 'conquer and divide'
approach to race. If blacks are fighting
Latinos, there's a recognition that prisoners
will not share a commonality - they will
fight amongst themselves."
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Smith v. City of Jackson
(03-1160)
Ruling Below: (Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183 (, 92 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1824;
84 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P41,521, 57 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1242, cert. granted 124
S.Ct. 1724, 158 L.Ed.2d 398).
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Southern District of Mississippi's ruling that a disparate impact
theory of liability is not available to plaintiffs seeking redress for age discrimination under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"). Three circuit courts had used the
Civil Rights Act of 1967 as a blueprint for allowing disparate impact claims under ADEA. The
Fifth Circuit held in accordance with six other circuits, finding that critical differences in the text
and legislative history of the statutes made it inappropriate to rely on the judicial theory of
disparate impact available under the Civil Rights Act in order to uphold a similar cause of action
under ADEA. After dismissing the disparate impact claim, the court vacated the district court's
summary judgment in favor of defendants on the disparate treatment claim and remanded the
case for further consideration of that issue.
Question Presented: Whether ADEA mirrors sufficiently Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 to support a similar inference that disparate impact claims, which are recognized under
Title VII, are available under ADEA without providing proof of discriminatory intent.
Azel P. SMITH et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants
v.
CITY OF JACKSON, Mississippi, Police Department of the CITY OF JACKSON,
Mississippi, Defendants-Appellees
United States Court of Appeals
For the Fifth Circuit
Revised, December 4, 2003
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
KING, Chief Judge: employees brought suit under ADEA for
injuries resulting from "a performance pay
plan ("the plan")," claiming that it
discriminated against older worker by
I. providing greater pay increases for "police
officers and public safety dispatchers
PROCEDURAL HISTORY (collectively "officers") under the age of
forty."]
[In 2001, thirty police department
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On September 6, 2002, while . . . plaintiffs'
motions were pending, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants on the plaintiffs' disparate
impact and disparate treatment claims and
denied the plaintiffs' pending motions as
moot. Final judgment was entered on this
same date.
The plaintiffs appeal this final judgment,
maintaining that: (1) the district court erred
in concluding that a disparate impact theory
of liability is not cognizable under the
ADEA. ...
III.
THE PLAINTIFFS' DISPARATE IMPACT
CLAIM
The plaintiffs raise both disparate treatment
and disparate impact theories of liability
here....
In a disparate treatment case, liability
depends on whether the protected trait - here,
age actually motivated the employer's
decision. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507
U.S. 604, 610, 123 L. Ed. 2d 338, 113 S. Ct.
1701 (1993). . . . Proof of discriminatory
motive is . . . critical to the success of a
plaintiffs discriminatory treatment claim. Id.
In contrast, in a disparate impact case,
liability may result without a demonstration
of discriminatory motive. Id. at 609....
In 1971, the Supreme Court held that
plaintiffs may bring disparate impact claims
under Title VII. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 430-31, 28 L. Ed. 2d 158, 91
S. Ct. 849 (1971). This judicial construction
of the statute was codified by Congress in
1991 to make clear that such a theory was
available to plaintiffs. See Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(a), 105
Stat. 1071, 1074-75 (adding 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(k)). The availability of a disparate
impact theory under the ADEA, however, is
not so clear. In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,
the Supreme Court expressly declined to
weigh in on whether the ADEA entitles a
plaintiff to bring a disparate impact cause of
action....
This express reservation has led to a debate
amongst the courts of appeals regarding
whether the ADEA, like Title VII, entitles a
plaintiff to bring a disparate impact
claim....
After surveying the well-traversed
arguments on either side of this debate, we
hold that the ADEA was not intended to
remedy age- disparate effects that arise from
the application of employment plans or
practices that are not based on age.
Fundamental to our decision is the ADEA's
express exception permitting employer
conduct based on "reasonable factors other
than age" an exception absent from Title
VII and the inapplicability to the ADEA
context of the policy justifications identified
by the Supreme Court (in Griggs, 401 U.S.
at 430-31) for recognizing a disparate
impact cause of action in the Title VII
context.
1. Similarities Between the ADEA and Title
VII
The construction of a statute begins with the
text of the statute itself. The ADEA
prohibits discrimination on the basis of age.
See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2000). It was enacted
in 1967, before the Supreme Court first
interpreted Title VII to allow employees to
prove discrimination by showing disparate
impact. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. [The
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text of ADEA sections that prohibit
discrimination based on age overlap almost
identically with Title VII sections that allow
support claims for disparate impact.] This is
no coincidence; "the prohibitions of the
ADEA were derived in haec verba from
Title VII." Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,
584, 55 L. Ed. 2d 40, 98 S. Ct. 866
(1978)....
2. Differences Between the ADEA and Title
VII
(1) Section 623((1) of the ADEA
The ADEA's prohibitions against age
discrimination in employment are qualified
by several exceptions to employer liability
set forth in § 623(f). Pursuant to one of these
exceptions, an employer can avoid liability
under the ADEA if the adverse employment
action is "based on reasonable factors other
than age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).
Neither the "reasonable factors other than
age" exception nor a parallel provision is
found in Title VII. Facially, the exception
appears to serve as a safe harbor for
employers who can demonstrate that they
based their employment action on a
reasonable non-age factor, even if the
decision leads to an age-disparate result. In a
pre-Hazen dissenting opinion, Judge
Easterbrook argues against recognizing a
disparate impact theory of liability under the
ADEA based on this "reasonable factors
other than age" exception:
[Section (f)(1)], which says
that "reasonable factors other
than age" may be the basis of
decision implies strongly
that t he employer may use a
ground of decision that is not
age, even if it varies with
age. . . . The sentence is
incomprehensible unless the
prohibition forbids disparate
treatment and the exception
authorizes disparate impact."
Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202,
1220 (7th Cir. 1987)....
We too find that the inclusion of the
"reasonable factors other than age"
exception to the ADEA creates a critical
"asymmetry" between the ADEA and Title
VII. ...
[The dissent suggests that] the prohibitory
section and the "reasonable factors other
than age" clause could together be read
[consistent with courts' treatment of Title
VII] as announcing a general rule that
disparate impact is actionable but then
carving out a defense for adverse impacts
that can be justified as a business
necessity.... We do not believe this course
is open to us, however. This circuit long ago
held that § 623(f)(1)'s "reasonable factors
other than age" provision does not create an
affirmative defense to liability; rather, it
allows the defendant to bring forward
evidence to negate the plaintiffs prima facie
case.... Therefore, we believe that ... the
ADEA does not prohibit employers from
taking actions based on non-age factors,
except when those non-age factors are so
related to age that they are mere proxies. ...
The conclusion that this "reasonable factors
other than age" exception textually
precludes a disparate impact theory of
liability under the ADEA is arguably
strengthened by the Supreme Court's
treatment of a similar exception to the Equal
Pay Act[,] . . . originally enacted in 1963. ..
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to prohibit discrimination in wages based on
gender. [T]he Equal Pay Act contains an
exception similar to the "reasonable factors
other than age" exception found in the
ADEA[. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
The Court's willingness to find that the
Equal Pay Act's "any factor other than sex"
exception precludes disparate impact
theories of liability under the Equal Pay Act
is helpful to our statutory construction of the
ADEA. Many provisions in the ADEA have
their roots i nt he F air Labor S tandards A ct
and the Equal Pay Act. See, e.g., Lorillard,
434 U.S. at 577-82. ...
(2) Legislative History and Policy
Considerations
Congress enacted the ADEA after receiving
a 1965 report by the Secretary of Labor
regarding the problems of older workers ...
[, which ] finds "no evidence of prejudice
based on dislike or intolerance of the older
worker" and concludes that the main
problem older workers faced in the
workplace was arbitrary age discrimination
- namely explicit age limitations - based on
misconceptions about the abilities of older
workers. . . . The Report likewise
distinguishes between "arbitrary
discrimination" based on age and other
institutional arrangements that have a
disproportionate effect on older workers,
finding that different solutions were
appropriate for these different problems. Id.
at 21-25....
On January 23, 1967, the Secretary
transmitted to Congress proposed legislation
entitled "Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967." In this letter, the
Secretary notes that the bill "provides for
attention to be given to institutional
arrangements which work to the
disadvantage of older workers," but that
"reasonable differentiations not based solely
on age . . . would not fall within the
proscription" of the bill. Id. . . .
In contrast to the refined purpose evidenced
in the historical underpinnings of the
ADEA's enactment, the Supreme Court's
opinion in Griggs discusses Title VII's
broad remedial purpose....
[The Court relied on the broad
Congressional purpose in enacting Title VII
to hold that even facially neutral practices
and those unmotivated by discriminatory
intent] "cannot be maintained if they operate
to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices." [401
U.S. at 430.]
The cornerstone of Griggs's holding that
disparate impact is cognizable under Title
VII is thus the link between the history of
educational discrimination on the basis of
race and the use of that discrimination to
continue to disadvantage individuals on the
basis of their race. Id. at 432. However,
absent from the scope of the ADEA are the
historical and remedial concerns that, in the
Title VII context, led to the recognition of
disparate impact claims directed at
overcoming the consequences of past
societal discrimination.
As Justice Stevens explained in his
concurring opinion in Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 48 L. Ed. 2d 5 97, 96 S. Ct.
2040 (1976), it is "inappropriate simply to
transplant . . . standards in their entirety into
a different statutory scheme having a
different history." Id. at 255 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).We heed this advice today and
therefore follow the majority of circuit
courts to have addressed this issue in
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holding that a disparate impact theory of
liability is not cognizable under the ADEA.
We find insufficient textual support for the
recognition of a disparate impact theory of
liability in the ADEA. Further, as we see it,
the conclusion that the holding in Griggs
should be extended to the ADEA context
based on the similarities in the prohibitory
sections of the ADEA and Title VII ignores
important considerations. It ignores the
existence of § 623(f)(1) - an express
exclusion of employer liability that is
present in the ADEA but not present in
parallel form in Title VII and it ignores the
differing purposes behind the ADEA and
Title VII. [The court noted language in





In contrast to the plaintiffs' disparate impact
claim, the plaintiffs' disparate treatment
claim is cognizable under the ADEA.
I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF
THE ADEA
The majority's analysis begins with the
premise that the RFOA exception of the
ADEA facially appears as a safe harbor to
employers.. . . The majority relies in part on
a pre-Hazen dissent by Judge Easterbrook in
Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., for the proposition
that the RFOA exception is
"incomprehensible unless the prohibition
forbids disparate treatment and the
exception authorizes disparate impact." 828
F.2d 1 202, 1 220 (7th C ir. 1 987) (emphasis
added).
* * *
Moreover, the strongest argument against
the language of the RFOA exception
precluding disparate impact lies in the
substantive provisions of the ADEA and
Title VII. In a similar case, a concurrence by




We AFFIRM in part, VACATE in part, and
REMAND the case to the district court.
Costs shall be borne by appellees.
CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part:
While I agree with the majority's disposition
of plaintiffs disparate treatment claim in
Part IV of the opinion, I also believe that the
district court erred in improvidently
dismissing the plaintiffs disparate impact
claim and, therefore, I must dissent with
regard to Part III.
. . . In light of the parallels
between the substantive
provisions of the ADEA and
Title VII, and in light of the
fact that Congress has
amended the ADEA several
times but has never explicitly
excluded disparate impact
claims, a reasonable
interpretation of the [RFOA
exception] is that it codifies
the business necessity
exception to disparate impact
claims.
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Adams, 255 F.3d at 1327-28 (Barkett, J.,
concurring).
. . . . Under a theory of disparate impact,
employers will still be able to have
employment practices and policies that may
burden over-age workers in a
disproportionate way. These practices will
be p ermissible, d espite t he d isproportionate
impact, provided the employer shows they
are supported by a business necessity. Upon
proving business necessity, the burden shifts
to the employee to show that the practice in
question was established not because of the
legitimacy of the necessity, but merely as a
pretext for invidious stereotyping. Therefore,
I am not persuaded that adopting a disparate
impact theory will lead to any
inconsistencies with the RFOA exception.
The flaw in the majority's logic [comparing
the ADEA with the Equal Pay Act] is that
the terms "any" and "reasonable" are not
synonymous. Under the ADEA, an
employer with a disparate impact policy
may be liable for age discrimination if
factors relied on were not reasonable.
Pursuant to the EPA, however, if an
employment policy causes wage differences
among men and women workers, the
employer will not be liable unless the policy
in question was based solely on gender.
Thus, the ADEA and EPA exceptions
cannot be read to have the same meaning
unless the word "reasonable" is omitted
from the RFOA exception.
Additionally, the majority's contention that
the ADEA and Title VII are not similar
statutes, insofar as their application of the
disparate impact theory, disregards the
doctrine of in pari materia. It has long been
held that judicial interpretations of one
statute may be informed by interpretations
of similar statutes....
In t he context oft he A DEA a nd Title V II,
adhering to this canon is particularly well
suited because, as the majority concedes, the
ADEA grew out of debates on Title VII.
Furthermore, in pari materia has relevance
because both aforementioned statutes apply
to similar persons (here, the employees) and
similar relationships (here, the employment
context). Moreover, Congress carefully
chose identical language for its statutes
dealing with both discrimination against
older workers and discrimination against
those due to race or gender. T herefore, t he
majority should have applied the doctrine of
in pari materia and interpreted the disparate
impact theory as applicable to the ADEA.
II. THE ADEA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
My second point of disagreement with the
majority concerns its portrayal of the
legislative history of the ADEA. . . .
Although the majority's opinion properly
recognizes that the Supreme Court's 1971
endorsement of the disparate impact theory
in Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31, was later in
time than Congress's enactment of the
ADEA in 1967, the majority attempts to
support its position by focusing on the
underlying purposes of the legislation.
Although the language of Title VII and the
ADEA are almost identical, the majority
essentially dismisses Griggs as irrelevant to
the calculus of age discrimination. . . . While
it is undoubtably true that Griggs recognized
disparate impact theory as an available tool
in the employment discrimination toolbox to
remedy past discrimination under Title VII,
it does not necessarily follow, as the
majority asserts, that the disparate impact
tool is available only in a remedial context.
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I disagree in two respects with the
majority's holding that disparate impact
theory should be limited to the context of
Title VII. First, the textual similarity
between Title VII and the ADEA evinces a
congressional intent to provide similar
protection against employment
discrimination under the two statutes.
Second, it is arguable whether historical
discrimination should be a necessary
precondition for recognizing a disparate
impact theory. I acknowledge, as the
majority does, that the ADEA and Title VII
are distinct because the former lacks a
history tied to past discrimination. . . . The
Supreme Court in Griggs, [however,] did
not posit historical discrimination as the sole
reason for disparate impact under Title
VII .... Moreover, the majority's emphasis
on the historical posture of the ADEA and
Title VII unduly minimizes the statutes
shared aim of ridding from the workplace an
environment of concealed discrimination.
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. Consistent with
such an aim, a disparate impact theory may
be a plaintiffs only tool in counteracting
sophisticated discrimination. Therefore, due
to the similarity of the ADEA and Title VII
language, it is my view that the protection
available under both statutes, including that
from disparate impact, should also be
similar.
III. CONCLUSION
[W]ith regards to Part III of the majority
opinion, I respectfully dissent.
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Supreme Court to Consider Role of Intent in Age Bias
The New York Times
March 30, 2004
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court agreed on Monday to
settle one of the most disputed questions in
civil rights law: how to win an age
discrimination case in the absence of proof
that an employer deliberately singled out
older workers for unfavorable treatment.
The issue in a case brought by a group of
older police officers in Jackson, Miss., is
whether the federal law against age
discrimination covers policies that do not
relate directly to age but that have a
disparate impact on older workers.
In this case, the older officers are trying to
show that new wage scales, intended to
make the pay for more recently hired
officers more competitive with other police
departments in the region, had the effect of
giving proportionately smaller increases to
the more senior officers. The 30 plaintiffs in
the lawsuit are all at least 40 years old, the
age at which coverage under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act begins.
Both the Federal District Court in Jackson
and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, in New Orleans, ruled for
the city on the ground that the law requires
proof of "disparate treatment," meaning
intentional discrimination. Neutral policies
that have a differential impact on different
age groups are not covered by the law, the
appeals court said in a 2-to-1 ruling last
November.
Other federal appellate circuits have reached
the opposite conclusion, and the legal
dispute has been raging for years. Two years
ago, the Supreme Court tried to resolve it in
a case brought by older workers against the
Florida Power Corporation. But the justices
dismissed that case without a decision after
the argument raised questions about whether
the company policies that were the basis. for
the complaint actually existed.
The Jackson police officers' appeal, Smith v.
City of Jackson, No. 03-1160, citing federal
labor statistics, said that 70 million
employees, nearly half the civilian labor
force, are at least 40 years old and are
therefore within the age-discrimination act's
coverage.
For more than 20 years, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission has
had a regulation on its books that adopts the
broader "disparate impact" interpretation of
the law. But when the issue was before the
Supreme Court two years ago, the Bush
administration did not defend the regulation
and filed no brief in the case.
Its reticence no doubt reflected the fact that
across the entire range of employment
discrimination law, the ability of judges to
impose remedies when plaintiffs have not
proven deliberate discrimination is under
sustained attack from employer groups and
conservative legal organizations. When the
earlier case was pending, one prominent
conservative group, the National Legal
Center for the Public Interest, published a
study of discrimination law that said that the
disparate-impact approach "deserves to be
attacked at every opportunity."
Interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which bars employment
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discrimination on the basis of race and sex,
the Supreme Court ruled that suits can be
brought under a disparate-impact theory
without proof of discriminatory intent.
Congress ratified that understanding when it
amended Title VII in 1991.
Congress used Title VII as a model when it
passed the age discrimination law in 1967,
and the argument has been that it should be
interpreted in the same manner. But there is
one textual difference, as Chief Judge
Carolyn Dineen King of the Fifth Circuit
pointed out in her majority opinion in the
new case before the Supreme Court. The age
discrimination law offers employers an
exemption "where the differentiation is
based on reasonable factors other than age."
Judge King, joined by Judge Patrick E.
Higginbotham, said that this phrase
"appears to preclude a disparate impact
theory of liability" because it "appears to
serve as a safe harbor for employers who
can demonstrate that they based their
employment action on a reasonable non-age
factor, even if the decision leads to an age-
disparate result."
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Carl E.
Stewart said that Congress intended in the
age discrimination law to offer the same
broad protection as it did in Title VII. Both
laws, he said, reflected the recognition "that
in a complex society, not all discrimination
is apparent or overt" but will often be
"subtle and concealed," lacking overt proof
of a discriminatory motivation.
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Being Unfair to the Gray-Haired
Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN)
August 22, 2004
Marshall H. Tanick
About half of the workforce in this country,
including more than a million Minnesotans,
has a big stake in a case that will be decided
this fall by the U.S. Supreme Court. The
case will determine the scope of the Federal
Age Discrimination Employment Act
(ADEA), which covers employees 40 years
and older.
The lawsuit, known as Smith vs. City of
Jackson, was brought by 30 older police
officers in Mississippi. The justices must
decide one of the most disputed issues in
civil rights law: whether employees who
claim age discrimination must prove that
management deliberately and intentionally
singled out older workers for unfavorable
treatment.
The answer is decisive: Many age
discrimination claims falter because they
lack proof that employers intended to harm
older workers. Courts generally have ruled
that adverse action taken against older
workers, including mass layoffs and other
policies that have an unfavorable impact, do
not violate the age-bias law because they do
not directly relate to age, even though they
might have a disparate impact on older
workers.
The police officers' case, thrown out by the
two lower courts, involves a new wage scale
that is intended to pay more to recently hired
officers in order to be more competitive with
other police departments. The older officers
claim that the increased compensation for
newer recruits results in proportionally
smaller raises for more senior officers in
violation of the ADEA.
Lower courts dismissed the case because of
the absence of any intentional discrimination.
They reasoned that neutral policies that
might inadvertently, but not intentionally,
have harmed different age groups are not
covered by the law.
The issue, however, is not so clear. One
appellate judge in the Mississippi case
dissented from the ruling, while other
federal appellate courts around the country
have reached opposite conclusions.
A couple of years ago, the Supreme Court
tried to resolve the issue in a lawsuit brought
by older workers w ho were p art of amass
layoff at a utility company in Florida. But, at
the last moment, the high court decided not
to take the case.
The issue now comes squarely before the
court in the new case for the 2004-2005 term,
which begins in October. While the case
affects the 30 individual police officers
involved int he c ase, it also h as significant
impact on the 70 million employees in the
United States who are 40 years old or older.
Disparate doctrine
The doctrine involved in the case is known
as "disparate impact." Under the principle,
employment policies or practices that are
neutral on their face but have an unfavorable
impact upon a particular group of employees
may be deemed discriminatory. The doctrine
applies in other civil rights cases involving
discrimination based on race or sex.
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The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), which regulates
compliance with federal discrimination laws,
has adopted the doctrine in its own
regulations. But the Bush administration has
balked at supporting it. In an unusual move,
the administration did not defend the EEOC
regulation, or even take a position in the
case. Intentional discrimination generally is
difficult to prove but is particularly hard to
show i n age-bias m atters. M anagement c an
usually cite factors that affect the
decisionmaking process related to age in
nearly any context. Aware of the potential
for bias claims, management rarely creates
or leaves a paper trail of discrimination.
Consequently, employees who suspect that
they have been the victims of age
discrimination must resort to circumstantial
evidence or inferences of intent rather than
direct proof.
Despite these hindrances, age discrimination
cases are increasing rapidly, largely because
of the graying of the workforce. During the
past year, federal courts decided nearly 300
age discrimination cases. Claims of age bias
make up about one-fourth of the
discrimination charges filed with the EEOC,
more than 19,000 of the total of 77,300
claims in 2003, and about one-sixth, 250 of
1,620 total claims, filed in recent years with
the parallel Minnesota Human Rights
Department.
Although the Mississippi case involves pay
differentials, the question of disparate
impact often arises in a different context. In
layoffs, older employees are usually the first
to be let go, often because of their higher
salaries. Under the disparate impact doctrine,
they would be less vulnerable to layoffs and
have more legal clout to contest them.
The Mississippi case is likely to have a
substantial impact not only on older
employees but across the spectrum of the
workplace. Depending upon the ruling, it
could affect the treatment of younger
employees. The outcome also could
influence how employers go about
establishing pay scales and select
individuals for 1 ayoffs. The Supreme Court
has not been particularly sympathetic to age
discrimination claimants in recent years. The
hostility is counter-intuitive to the aging of
the court, eight of whose nine members are
65 years or older, and who average 70 years
of age.
But they do not face the prospect of losing
their jobs or their
livelihoods because they are appointed for
life terms. This case might be their legacy
for the ages.
180




Employers can expect a lot more age
discrimination claims in the years ahead,
thanks to a combination of demographic and
economic factors. Already, the number of
age bias charges filed with the federal Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) is on the upswing, and that trend
will accelerate as millions of baby boomers
approach retirement age.
The leading edge of the baby-boom
generation-those born in 1 946-will soon
reach retirement age, while the youngest of
the boomers turn 40 this year-the
minimum age for coverage under the 1967
Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA). More than half the nation's
population is now older than 40.
Not only will more people be covered under
ADEA, but many more will work longer
because they have no pension or need to
boost retirement savings. "The sheer force
of changing demographics means you're
going to see more claims," says David
Wissert, director of the employment law
practice for the New Jersey law firm of
Lowenstein Sandler.
Adding to the likelihood of more lawsuits is
the fact that additional layoffs are hitting
white-collar workers, including experienced
midlevel managers "who are used to dealing
with lawyers and fighting for their rights,"
says Lawrence Lorber, a Washington, D.C.,
employment lawyer for the firm of
Proskauer Rose.
A Supreme Court decision due next year
will likely have a big impact on age bias
complaints. The high court will review a
case (Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss.) that
could determine whether the ADEA bars
employment policy changes that would have
a disproportionately negative effect on older
workers, even if that wasn't the intention.
Federal appeals courts have split over
whether ADEA should apply in such
"disparate impact" cases, and businesses are
looking to the Supreme Court to provide a
definitive answer.
In the Smith case, a group of older Jackson,
Miss., police officers claimed discrimination
over a new city pay plan that gave larger pay
raises to workers with five years or fewer on
the job. The city said it made the policy
change to ensure competitive starting pay
scales to attract new officers.
The Court's decision could also affect
proposed EEOC rule changes that would
allow employers to reduce or eliminate
health care coverage for retirees who reach
age 65 when eligibility for federal Medicare
coverage kicks in. The Bush administration
has put a temporary hold on the rules in the
face of opposition from AARP, an
association that represents people 50 years
old or older.
If B ush is reelected, he's likely to take his
cue from the court decision. If Democratic
Sen. John Kerry takes the White House,
he'll likely kill the proposed EEOC rules.
An increasing number of age discrimination
complaints now stems from benefits policy
changes that employers adopt to cut costs or
stay competitive. Examples include
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converting traditional defined-benefit
pensions to cash-balance plans or scrapping
seniority-based compensation or promotion
policies in favor of performance-based plans.
With employers facing higher health care
and benefits costs, future economic
downturns are sure to bring more age
discrimination complaints, says Tom
Osborne, a litigation attorney with AARP.
"As the economy worsens, you see the older
workers are the first ones to go because
they're the highest paid ...You get more bang
for the buck," he adds.
Although EEOC isn't budgeting for
additional enforcement staff, "we absolutely
are looking closely at what's happening with
age discrimination charges," says Jennifer
Kaplan, an EEOC spokeswoman.
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The youngest baby boomers turn 40 this
year, leaving an entire generation not only in
the throes of middle age but also protected
by federal law from age discrimination in
the workplace.
Despite the big demographic shift, there's
been no explosion of age discrimination
charges so far. The U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission received an annual
average of 19,500 age claims over the past
two years, down slightly from 1992-93, and
claims actually declined 4 percent in 2003
from a year earlier.
But some experts think it may be only a
matter of time before discrimination claims
go up now that workers 40 or older comprise
about half the nation's work force
particularly with the age group now
dominated by a generation known for going,
and getting, its own way.
"Since this generation is not shy about
asserting their rights, I think you can expect
to see an increase, maybe as people get into
their 50s and 60s or in the next big
economic downturn," said Joe Markowitz, a
Los Angeles-based attorney who represents
fired employees.
Thanks partly to medical advances and a
growing life span, many boomers anticipate
having the option to work longer at their
jobs than previous generations did. If they
want to be able to fund ambitious retirement
plans, they may have little choice other than
to do so.
But what if their employers decide otherwise?
The result can be a worker's nightmare:
Getting replaced by a younger, cheaper
employee. Proving age discrimination,
however, has been difficult.
Ron Harper says he planned to be an
insurance agent with his company until he
was 7 5. B ut he w as only 48 when A Ilstate
eliminated his job, along with those of about
6,500 other agents more than 90 percent of
them 40 or older.
Following the layoffs in 2000, Northbrook,
Ill.-based Allstate rehired the agents as
independent c ontractors, a move that saved
it $600 million a year. Harper, one of 29
agents who sued the company in 2001,
contends Allstate took the action not only to
save on retirement benefits but to evade
employment laws.
"In essence, what they did was, they
outsourced us," said the 52- year-old Harper.
"They outsourced our jobs to ourselves.
"Why'd they do it? They did it because
we're 'old,' and because of those benefits,"
said Harper, who now owns a pizza
restaurant in Thomson, Ga., where he had
worked for Allstate.
Allstate disputed that, and so did a federal
judge in Philadelphia.
Judge John Fullam said last month Allstate
had improperly required the agents to sign a
release waiving their right to sue for
discrimination in order to stay on as
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independent contractors, clearing the way
for a trial. But he ruled that the company did
not commit age discrimination because,
even though the median age those affected
was 50, "employees of all ages were treated
alike."
In another case, John Guz sued Bechtel
National after being laid off at 49, charging
he was illegally fired - in part because of his
age. He had earned major promotions, merit
raises and generally favorable job reviews in
22 years with the San Francisco-based
engineering and construction company.
But the California Supreme Court held in
2000 that older workers fired during staff
reductions may not claim age discrimination
simply because some younger employees
were retained.
Age discrimination is "very difficult to
prove right now," said Michael Lieder, a
Washington-based attorney in the case
against Allstate. "Right now the burden is on
the plaintiff for proving that the employer
has some sort of stereotype that prompted
them to take the action."
A case that's to be argued before the U.S.
Supreme Courtin the fall, involving police
officers in Jackson, Miss., could alter the
legal landscape dramatically. The high court
said this spring it would consider their
appeal in order to clarify what older workers
must prove in order to claim that employers
were biased in favor of younger people.
In the Jackson case, 30 officers and
dispatchers sued over a pay plan they said
gave bigger raises to workers under 40. A
lower court ruled against them.
"If the Supreme Court decides in favor of
the employees, there's going to be a whole
lot more cases go forward," said Bob
Riordan, an Atlanta-based labor lawyer.
In the meantime, companies that can cite
valid business reasons for layoffs are on
solid legal ground.
"Employers have become more savvy about
how to eliminate positions and restaff in the
most economical way," said Heather Sager,
a San Francisco attorney who represents
management in employment lawsuits. "To
that end, numbers save the day when an
employer decides to eliminate an older
worker's position and restructure it into a
job filled by a younger worker."
Age discrimination in the workplace extends
beyond layoffs, of course, but it's even
harder to prove the existence of any age
related "glass ceiling" the invisible barrier
that prevents employees from advancing any
higher.
Workplace consultant Connie Wang
suspects many older professionals believe
they're the victims of age discrimination but
wouldn't challenge their employers because
of an underlying concern that, "Who's going
to hire me at my age?"
"We may have a much bigger problem than
we can prove on paper," said Wang,
managing director of CSW Global, a
Connecticut-based consulting firm
specializing in diversity issues. "People may




Ruling Below: (Doe v. Tenet, 9th Cir., 329 F.3d 1135, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10667, 61 Fed. R.
Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 628, 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4460, 2003 Daily Journal DAR 5732)
Federal law does not preclude alleged former spies from pursuing their constitutional, statutory,
regulatory, or estoppel claims in district court, so long as these claims are not based on a contract
between themselves and the CIA. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876), is applicable
through the use of current state secrets doctrine; however, the government has not yet asserted
that privilege.
Question Presented: May former spies who claim that the CIA promised to financially support
them in return for their services during the Cold War sue the CIA for failure to fulfill its promise
to pay them?
John DOE and Jane DOE, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
V.
George J. TENET, Individually and as Director of Central Intelligence and Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants-Appellants.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit
Decided May 29, 2003.
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
BERZON, Circuit Judge
Jane and John Doe-fictitious names,
adopted for this litigation for reasons that
will appear-assert that they performed
espionage activities on behalf of the United
States against a former Eastern bloc country.
The Central Intelligence Agency (the
"CIA"), they say, assured them that it would
provide assistance in resettling in the United
States as well as lifetime financial and other
support. According to the Does, the CIA has
now reneged on its obligation of support.
The United States will neither confirm nor
deny the Does' allegations, for reasons of
national security.
We must decide whether the Does can sue
the CIA for the alleged wrongs committed
by the Agency, or whether, instead, their
action is either appropriate only in the Court
of Federal Claims or precluded by the
venerable doctrine enunciated in Totten v.
United States, 92 U.S. 105, 23 L.Ed. 605
(1875). ...
We assume, without deciding, that the facts
as alleged by the Does are true and construe
the complaint in the light most favorable to
their c ase. See B urgert v. Lokelani B ernice
Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th
Cir. 2000). The facts that appear in this
opinion, with the exception of procedural
history in federal court, are all, therefore,
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simply allegations, even when not stated as
such.
The Does allege that they were citizens of an
Eastern bloc country formerly considered an
adversary of the United States. During his
tenure as a high ranking diplomat for that
country during the Cold War, Mr. Doe
approached a person associated with the
United States embassy and requested
assistance in defecting to the United States. .
The agents told the Does that if they agreed
to conduct espionage on behalf of the United
States, the CIA would arrange for their
resettlement in the United States and ensure
their financial and personal security "for
life." The Does further allege that the agents
assured them that this assistance was
approved at the highest level of authority at
the CIA and was mandated by U.S. law.
The Does state that although they were
initially reluctant to conduct espionage
activities, they eventually agreed to do what
was asked of them. They allege that they
carried out their end of the bargain but that
the Agency has now reneged and abandoned
them to fend for themselves.
The Does eventually settled in the Seattle
area, and were initially provided with a
stipend of $20,000 per year, as well as
housing and other benefits. Over time, their
stipend was increased to $27,000. They say
that with t he C IA's a ssistance in providing
false identities, resumes, and references, Mr.
Doe obtained professional employment in
1987.
As a result of a corporate merger in 1997,
Mr. Doe lost his job....
In 1997, the Does were allegedly informed
by a CIA representative that the Agency had
determined that the benefits they had
previously been provided had been adequate
compensation for the services rendered and
that further support would not be provided.
The Does were then told that they could
appeal this decision to the Director. The
Does' counsel therefore prepared an appeal
to the Director. While so doing, the Does'
counsel repeatedly requested from the
Agency internal regulations governing the
appeals process as well as regulations
regarding resettled aliens. The CIA never
responded to these requests. Other requests
for access to records or individuals within
the CIA were also either denied or ignored
by the CIA.
Nevertheless, the Does claim, they filed
their administrative appeal with the Director
in late 1997. It was subsequently denied.
The Does assert that they then appealed to
the Helms Panel, a panel consisting of
former Agency officials. The Does allege
that the Helms Panel recommended that the
Agency provide the plaintiffs "certain
benefits . . . for a period not to exceed one
year, and nothing thereafter." The payment
was conditioned on the Does' signing
waivers and release documents. Apparently,
the Does declined to execute such
documents and therefore did not receive the
payments recommended by the Helms
Panel.
The Does then filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Western District of
Washington. They asserted claims under the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
of the United States Constitution, seeking
declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief.
Their complaint further requested that the
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district court require the CIA to resume
payment of the benefits allegedly promised
and provide constitutionally adequate
internal review procedures. . . . The district
court determined that the trial could proceed
despite the alleged existence of a secret
agreement, and any materials involving
national security interests could be
adequately protected by submission under
seal or by in camera review.
The district court also rejected the CIA's
contention that the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1346, requires that this case be heard in the
United States Court of Federal Claims,
because, according to the Agency, this was
essentially a contract suit seeking money
damages from the United States....
The district court went on to determine that
the Does had properly stated both
substantive and procedural due process
claims, even apart from the existence of an
alleged secret contract with the Agency. ...
At the outset, we must address whether the
Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1),
precludes the district court from exercising
jurisdiction in this case. That Act, in
relevant part, grants the Court of Federal
Claims exclusive jurisdiction over any claim
against the United States in excess of
$10,000 that is "founded . . . upon any
express or implied contract with the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).
The Does' complaint may be read as seeking
an injunction directing payment of $27,000
per year because that figure was agreed
upon by the Does and the CIA. Such an
award derived from the agreement of the
parties, although phrased in terms of
constitutional due process, would amount to
specific performance of the contract that the
Does allege that they had with the
government-an agreement to "ensure
financial and personal security for life."
That type of claim falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.
See North Star, 14 F.3dat37-38. . . The
Tucker Act is a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity for contract actions; equitable
contract remedies denied to the Court of
Federal Claims are not within the waiver
and may not be enforced against the United
States at all. See id. at 38.
The primary additional claim is based on an
interest in liberty. The Does[ ] claim that,
regardless of the terms of their contract or
whether a contract even existed, the CIA
brought them into this country under
conditions requiring a false identity and
false history for their continuing safety. The
Does allege and declare that, because of the
false history and false references supplied by
the CIA and the CIA's refusal to assist them
further, no employment is available to them
in the United States now that Mr. Doe's
employment here was terminated. The
failure of the CIA to provide the means for
their subsistence, according to the Does,
leaves them no alternative but to return to
eastern Europe, where they are in danger.
The district court held that the Does had
raised a triable i ssue of fact with regard to
this claim based on a liberty interest. The
district court also held that these same
allegations and declarations presented a
triable issue of a due process violation based
on the duty of the government not to act
affirmatively to place a person in a
dangerous situation. See Huffman v. County
of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th
Cir. 1998). Without indicating any view as
to the ultimate merits of these claims, we
find no error in the district court's ruling
denying summary judgment and permitting
these claims to go forward. . . . We also
conclude that the district court is not
187
precluded by the Tucker Act from
entertaining these claims, because they are
not founded upon, and do not depend on,
any alleged contract between the CIA and
the Does.
Resolution of this case also requires us to
decide whether Totten bars judicial review
of this action.
One hundred twenty-five years ago, the
Supreme Court dismissed a civil w ar s py's
case for damages for breach of a contract
with the government. See Totten, 92 U.S.
105, 23 L.Ed. 605. The Agency maintains
that as this case is also one by spies seeking
recompense, Totten squarely governs this
case. We do not agree. Totten was indeed a
landmark case, and one that retains its core
vitality. But . . . Totten does not require
immediate dismissal as to the Does' case
because their claims those that survive our
Tucker Act analysis-do not arise out of an
implied or express contract. Instead, the
instant case is governed by the state secrets
privilege, a separate aspect of the decision in
Totten that has evolved into a well-
articulated body of law addressing situations
in which security interests preclude the
revelation of factual matter in court.
The Agency and the dissent treat Totten as a
jurisdictional bar to any case arising out of a
relationship involving spy services. . . . We
do not read Totten so broadly.
Read with care, Totten embodies two rulings.
The first, often mistaken for a blanket
prohibition on suits arising out of acts of
espionage, is instead simply a holding
concerning contract law: In Totten, the
plaintiff, Lloyd, breached his contract with
the President by revealing the contract's
contents in his lawsuit. The Supreme Court
held that because an implicit aspect of the
contract was that the parties agreed to keep
the very existence of the contract secret,
"[t]he publicity produced by an action would
itself be a breach of a contract of that kind,
and thus defeat a recovery." See id.; see also
Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 44
(2d Cir. 1958) . . . . For two reasons, the
contractual holding of Totten is not
applicable here. First, . . . unlike Totten, the
Does do not seek only enforcement of a
contract. Rather their principal concern at
this point, as they explain in their brief to
this court, is "to compel fair process and
application of substantive law to their claims
within the Central Intelligence Agency's ...
internal administrative process." As the
Agency is accustomed to conducting its
affairs in secret, a fair internal process could
presumably proceed in accordance with the
secrecy i mplicit i n an agreement to engage
in espionage.
Second, Totten assumed "publicity"
inconsistent with the implicit promise of
secrecy as inherent in any judicial
proceeding and did not consider whether
there are means to conduct judicial
proceedings without unacceptable attendant
"publicity." Since Totten, courts, including
the Supreme Court, have developed means
of accommodating asserted national security
interests in judicial proceedings while
remaining mindful that there are
circumstances in which no special
procedures will be adequate to protect those
interests. To the extent that the court can
proceed without generating public exposure,
it may be possible to fulfill any secrecy
promise implicit in the agreement,
Here, the Does have so far proceeded in a
manner that has not breached the agreement.
They have done everything in their power
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not to reveal secret information: They filed
suit under fictitious names and revealed only
minimal, nonidentifying details in their
complaint. Their attorneys for security
reasons cleared their complaint with CIA
officials before filing it, and received
security clearances from the CIA.
Thus, Totten 's holding with regard to
enforcement of the secrecy aspect of
contracts for spy services should not entirely
preclude further proceedings in this suit.
And with some creativity in devising
flexible procedures such as those suggested
by courts that have grappled with these
issues in the century and a quarter since
Totten, it may prove possible to resolve the
essential issues through court processes....
The other element of Totten is an early
expression of the evidentiary state secrets
privilege: "[P]ublic policy forbids the
maintenance of any suit in a court of justice,
the trial of which would inevitably lead to
the disclosure of matters which the law itself
regards as confidential, and respecting
which it will not allow the confidence to be
violated." Totten, 92 U.S. at 107 (emphasis
added). This public policy principle has
flowered into the state secrets doctrine of
today. It is principally in this context that the
Supreme Court has reaffirmed Totten 's
currency.
It is therefore the law of this circuit that
Totten permits dismissal of cases in which it
is asserted that the very subject matter is a
state secret only after complying with the
formalities and court investigation
requirements that have developed since
Totten within the framework of the state
secrets doctrine. . . . This understanding of
the role of Totten in the contemporary legal
world comports with both Totten and later
Supreme Court authority. . .. Moreover, it is
primarily in the context of the state secrets
privilege that the Supreme Court in recent
years has affirmatively cited to Totten.
We therefore conclude that Totten is
applicable to the case before us only as
applied through the prism of current state
secrets doctrine....
To invoke the state secrets privilege, a
formal claim of privilege must be "lodged
by the head of the department which has
control over the matter, after actual personal
consideration [of the evidence] by that
officer." Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8, 73 S.Ct.
528 (footnotes omitted); see also Kasza, 133
F.3d at 1165. After that, "[t]he court itself
must determine whether the circumstances
are appropriate for the claim of privilege."
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8, 73 S.Ct. 528; see
also Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1165. The
government has not thus far asserted the
state secrets privilege in this case and has
therefore not complied with the required
procedures.
Finally, because of the limited nature of a
procedural due process inquiry, the specifics
of the Does' relationship with the CIA-
such as the place and manner in which they
were recruited, their contacts, and the nature
of the espionage-should not need to be
revealed. Rather the evidentiary inquiry can
be tailored to determine whether the alleged
relationship with the CIA in fact existed and,
if so, whether the resulting relationship gave
rise to a legally cognizable property or
liberty interest.
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As to whether the CIA's procedures
adequately protect any such interest, it is not
clear that the agency will claim a secrecy
interest in those internal procedures. If it
does, the court may well be able to review
the available procedure for consistency with
constitutional standards in proceedings not
open to the public.
It is therefore possible that, after the most
careful, respectful, and deferential inquiry,
the district court could conclude that the
Does' case may go forward in some manner,
whether in open court or closed, without
jeopardizing any state secrets. Accordingly,
this case should be remanded to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with
the current law on the state secrets privilege,
and with this opinion....
The national interest normally requires both
protection of state secrets and the protection
of fundamental constitutional rights. Here,
the CIA has not invoked the state secrets
privilege nor has the district court had the
opportunity independently to review the
invocation of such a privilege. We should
not precipitously close the courthouse doors
to colorable claims of the denial of
constitutional rights. The Does' case must
therefore be remanded to the district court to
provide the Agency the opportunity to
formally invoke the state secrets privilege. If
the Agency chooses to do so, the district
court must then, after careful inquiry and
consideration of alternative modes of
adjudication, and with the utmost deference
to the government's determination of
national security interests, evaluate whether
any aspect of the Does' case can go forward.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN
PART AND REMANDED
TALLMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
It is the prerogative o ft he S upreme C ourt,
not ours, to decide whether Totten v. United
States, 92 U.S. 105, 23 L.Ed. 605 (1875),
continues to bar judicial review of actions
arising from espionage services performed
for the United States by secret agents, or
whether the Totten doctrine has somehow
been supplanted by the modern state secrets
evidentiary privilege articulated in United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 73 S.Ct. 528,
97 L.Ed. 727 (1953). My colleagues
proclaim that Totten is "applicable to the
case before us only as applied through the
prism of current state secrets doctrine." Maj.
Op. at 1151. But Totten holds that claims
brought by secret agents against the
government are nonjusticiable. Reynolds, on
the other hand, protects against the unveiling
of state secrets during the prosecution of an
otherwise recognized cause of action. Far
from modifying Totten, the Court's opinion
in Reynolds reaffirms Totten's jurisdictional
bar.
Furthermore, the majority fails to recognize
the j urisdictional limitation imposed on the
Does' lawsuit by the Tucker Act, which
requires that this suit be brought in the Court
of Federal Claims. Because the court's
opinion is contrary to the clear rule
announced in Totten, and ignores the
limitations on our jurisdiction imposed by
the Tucker Act, I respectfully dissent. ...
In Totten, the estate of William A. Lloyd, a
spy hired by President Abraham Lincoln to
gain information on Confederate troop
positions during the Civil War, sought to
recover in the Court of Claims compensation
Lloyd had allegedly been promised under
his secret agreement with the President. 92
U.S. at 105-06. The Supreme Court upheld
the lower court's dismissal of the suit,
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concluding that the very nature of the
contract foreclosed a suit for its enforcement.
Id. at 107....
The rule in Totten is not limited to breach of
contract claims brought by those providing
secret services to the government.
Expanding its holding beyond the contract
analysis, the Totten Court reasoned that
"general principle[s] [of] public policy
forbid[ ] the maintenance of any suit in a
court of justice, the trial of which would
inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters
which the law itself regards as confidential,
and respecting which it will not allow the
confidence to be violated." Id. at 107
(emphasis added). Implicit in the Court's
public policy holding is an understanding
that fundamental principles of separation of
powers prohibit judicial review of secret
contracts entered into by the Executive
Branch in its role as guardian of national
security. See id. at 106 (discussing the
President's powers as Commander in Chief);
see also Dept. of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S.
518, 527, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918
(1988) (stating that the authority to protect
national security information falls to the
President as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed services and head of the Executive
Branch of government.).
There is a key distinction between spy cases
like Totten and other classes of cases where
Congress has provided an express remedy
for relief. In the latter, the evidentiary
privilege known as "state secrets" may
properly be invoked to block otherwise
relevant discovery in a recognized cause of
action. An example is United States v.
Reynolds. In Reynolds, the Supreme Court
considered-in the context of a tort claim
discovery dispute-the protection afforded
to discovery of evidence that would reveal
state secrets. Id. at 3, 73 S.Ct. 528 ....
While Totten and Reynolds are closely
related in that both protect a state secret
from disclosure, the rules announced in
those cases differ in subtle but important
respects. Most importantly, the state secrets
privilege in Reynolds permits the
government to withhold otherwise relevant
discovery from a recognized cause of action
(e.g., an FTCA case), while the Totten
doctrine permits the dismissal of a lawsuit
because it is non-justiciable before such
evidentiary questions are ever reached.
The majority opinion also errs in limiting
the application of Totten to contract claims.
While such a limitation is necessary to reach
the result the majority is determined to
announce in this case, the holding in Totten
belies such a confined application. Rather,
the rule announced in Totten extends to
claims for tort or constitutional violations
arising from the secret contractual
relationship.
Totten itself did not limit its holding to those
cases involving contracts for secret services.
Instead, the Court held that "public policy
forbids the maintenance of any suit in a
court of justice, the trial of which would
inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters
which the law itself regards as confidential."
92 U.S. at 107 (emphasis added). The Court
did not limit its holding to those
circumstances where a secret contract must
be revealed. Rather, the Court held, much
more generally, that the maintenance of a
suit is forbidden where any matter which the
law regards as confidential would have to be
disclosed. Id.
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To succeed on their substantive due process
claim, the Does would have to establish
either that a relationship with the CIA in fact
existed or that the CIA affirmatively placed
them in danger. This they cannot do, for "the
employment and the service were to be
equally concealed." Totten, 92 U.S. at 106.
Although I do not think it is necessary to the
resolution of this case, I note that even if the
Does' claims could somehow overcome the
Totten bar (which they c annot), the Tucker
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), requires the
Does to bring this case in the Court of
Federal Claims.
The Tucker Act grants exclusive jurisdiction
to the Court of Federal Claims for suits
against the United States whenever an action
seeks money damages or arises from an
express or implied contract. 28 U.S.C. §
1491(a)(1); Demontiney v. United States ex
rel. Dept. of Interior, 255 F.3d 801, 810 (9th
Cir. 2001)....
We lack the power to exercise subject matter
jurisdiction when Congress has given it to
another court. The Does should not be
permitted to evade the valid jurisdictional
limitations of the Tucker Act by labeling
their action as something other than what it
truly is: a breach of contract claim.
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The Supreme Court agreed yesterday to
review a lower court's decision that
permitted an alleged husband-wife Cold
War spy team to. sue the CIA for allegedly
breaking a promise to provide them financial
and personal security for life after they
carried out espionage for the United States.
At issue is a 130-year-old Supreme Court
ruling in a Civil War espionage case that
said courts cannot hear cases involving
disputes over spying contracts because they
involve a secret enterprise and "disclosure of
the service might compromise or embarrass
our government in its public duties."
In his successful petition to get the justices
to review the case, Solicitor General
Theodore B. Olson noted that since it was
created in 1947, the CIA has been able "to
obtain dismissal at the outset of such
complaints" and said changing that practice
would not only hurt foreign relations but
also "impair the ability of the CIA to
conduct clandestine intelligence operations."
Although the CIA has not acknowledged it
hired the couple, the lawsuit filed by the pair
- under the names John and Jane Doe - said
the husband was a high-ranking Eastern
European diplomat who initially wanted to
defect but was persuaded to stay at his post
and spy for the United States. In exchange,
the couple said, the CIA promised to
arrangefor their resettlement in the U.S. and
ensure their financial and personal security
'for life,' according to the opinion of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit.
When their spying was over, the couple was
brought to the United States under a law that
permits the CIA director to waive
immigration rules. The agency eventually
settled the couple in Seattle with new
identities, housing and other benefits, plus a
yearly stipend that started at $20,000. With
r6sum6s and references supplied by the
agency, the man got a job in 1987, and, as
his salary increased, the CIA's stipend
decreased. Within two years, his salary had
hit $27,000, the amount of the stipend at that
time, and the subsidy was ended. But the
former s py w as given assurances that i f he
lost his job, "his stipend would be resumed"
and the CIA would "always be there" for
him and his wife, according to the court
opinion.
In 1997, the man lost his job and could not
find another. The couple say that the CIA
refused to assist in finding new employment
and that eventually they turned to a lawyer.
When internal CIA appeals did not get a
satisfactory result, they sued in federal court.
The CIA said the 1875 Civil War ruling,
known as Totten v. United States, required
dismissal. In that case, the spy, William A.
Lloyd, was "under a contract with President
Lincoln, made in July 1861" to gather
intelligence behind the South's lines for
$200 a month, according to the opinion. The
court ruled that Lloyd's legal action in effect
broke the contract, which required secrecy.
In the current case, the district court ruled
that a trial could proceed "despite the
alleged existence of a secret agreement,"
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and that national security could be protected
by sealing evidence and conducting judicial
review in private. The circuit court said
Totten applied only when a contract exists
and that the couple could continue the suit
"in a manner that avoids public exposure of
any secret information."
A CIA spokesman, Bill Harlow, said
yesterday that the agency would not
comment on the ruling.
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How the U.S. Supreme Court deals with a
lawsuit filed by a pair of Cold War spies
now living in the Seattle area could
determine how successful America is in
recruiting spies for the war on terrorism, the
couple's lawyer said yesterday.
The high court yesterday said it would hear
the case of the couple, identified only as
John and Jane Doe, who sued the CIA and
its former director, George Tenet, in 1999,
claiming they were abandoned by the
agency after risking their lives.
Steven Hale, the attorney for the couple and
a former CIA lawyer himself, said the case
has shaped into the "granddaddy" case that
should define the rights of people who spy
for the U.S. and the responsibilities of the
government to take care of them.
"There's never been a case quite as on-point
as this one," said Hale.
Hale sees stark similarities between the Cold
War and the emerging war on terrorism.
How the case of his clients is decided, he
believes, will determine whether the U.S.
will be able to obtain the sort of "human
intelligence" that the government has
admitted it lacked before the Sept. 11, 2001,
attacks.
"Can you imagine trying to recruit a general
from Iran, or Pakistan, or Afghanistan, when
they know that this government could
simply cast them aside?" Hale asked. "I
can't see how this administration could try
to recruit these people, and ask them to risk
their lives, under this policy."
At issue is a Civil War-era doctrine that
prohibits courts from reviewing secret
agreements between the U.S. and its spies.
In 1861, a man named William Lloyd was
paid $200 a month by President Abraham
Lincoln to infiltrate the Confederacy and
provide information on the rebel army's
troop movements and fortifications. The
man's estate later attempted to get more
money. The justices, in a case called "Totten
vs. United States," decided that such "secret
service" contracts cannot be reviewed by the
courts.
Assistant U.S. Attorney Brian Kipnis agreed
that the appeal turns squarely on the so-
called "Totten Doctrine," which the
Supreme Court has not addressed head-on in
129 years.
"This is the first time this doctrine has been
directly examined in a long, long time,"
Kipnis said.
The CIA claims the doctrine should preclude
the Seattle-area couple from suing. However,
a federal judge in Seattle and a panel from
the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals have ruled
in favor of the couple.
Their 1999 lawsuit alleges that John Doe
was a senior diplomat for an unnamed
Eastern Bloc country - identified only as
an "enemy" of the U.S. - during the Cold
War, which lasted from the end of World
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War II until the dissolution of the Soviet
Union in the late 1980s.
Doe says that, while working as a diplomat
in a third country, he attempted to defect.
Instead, he was reluctantly recruited by the
CIA as a spy. He says he undertook
increasingly dangerous assignments until his
exposure as a spy and subsequent death
sentence were imminent.
Despite the end of the Cold War, Doe says
his life remains in danger because of the
amount and type of information he provided
his U.S. handlers.
The couple - Doe's wife is identified as a
diplomat as well - eventually settled in the
Seattle area and were provided with new
identities and given help finding jobs using
CIA-generated resumes. John Doe claims
the agency promised him lifelong support.
However, Doe lost his job and the agency
cut him loose - first citing budget
constraints, and later saying the government
had paid enough for the services he rendered.
Hale said all the Does want is a fair way to
review the CIA's decision.
"The government would have you believe
they want some sort of stipend that will keep
them fat and sassy," said Hale, whose firm is
handling the case for free. "Nothing could
be farther from the truth."
His firm, Perkins Coie, has spent nearly $1.6
million so far on the Doe litigation.
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Tuesday, the federal appeals court in
Washington, D.C., ruled that the
government is not obligated to release the
names of detainees (nor those of their
lawyers) who were taken into custody in the
wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001.
The D.C. Circuit's 2-to-i ruling came as a
defeat for activist groups that had filed a
Freedom of Information Act suit, seeking to
force the government to disclose
information about the detainees and the
circumstances of their arrests and detention.
But the decision in Center for National
Security Studies v. Department of Justice
also came as a victory for common sense.
The court accepted as reasonable the
government's argument that "disclosure of
the detainees' names would enable al Qaeda
or other terrorist groups to map the course of
the investigation and thus develop the means
to impede it." In reaching this result, the
court embraced the traditional view that a
healthy dose of judicial deference to the
executive branch is warranted when it comes
to national-security matters. As Judge David
Sentelle's majority opinion noted: "America
faces an enemy just as real as its former
Cold War foes, with capabilities beyond the
capacity of the judiciary to explore."
Regrettably, however, such clear thinking
was not in evidence in a recent decision
issued by the federal appeals court on the
other side of the country. To wit, three
weeks ago, the Ninth Circuit, which handles
appeals from California and six other
western states, plus Alaska and Hawaii,
lived up to its reputation for activist
jurisprudence - big-time.
In Doe v. Tenet, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
a pair of ex-spies (allegedly onetime citizens
of a former Soviet bloc country recruited as
U.S. agents) could proceed with their
lawsuit against the Central Intelligence
Agency.
The plaintiffs, John and Jane Doe, allege
that the CIA reneged on a promise to
provide them with lifetime financial security
and other assistance. As the court explained,
the plaintiffs allege that after performing
whatever services they were recruited to
perform, they were resettled in the United
States, where the CIA provided them with
compensation and helped Doe obtain
employment. The CIA allegedly continued
to supplement their income until Doe's
salary reached a certain level, at which point
the payments were stopped. Later, however,
Doe lost his job, and the CIA allegedly
declined to resume payments or to provide
any further benefits. So the former spies
sued the CIA, asserting various due-process
and equal-protection claims.
Judge Marsha Berzon wrote the majority
opinion, in which she explained that the
former spies' lawsuit was not precluded by
the precedent established by the Supreme
Court in Totten v. United States. In that
post-Civil War case, the Court ruled that the
estate of an agent hired by President Lincoln
to spy on the Confederacy could not sue the
government to enforce the secret agreement.
Focusing on the inherently secretive nature
of espionage activity, the Court erected a
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barrier against "any suit in a court of justice,
the trial of which would inevitably lead to
the disclosure of matters which the law itself
regards as confidential." Suits filed by spies
against the government would fall into this
category.
Undaunted by this seemingly
insurmountable hurdle, Judge Berzon
theorized that when "[r]ead with care,"
Totten does not require dismissal of all cases
arising out of an espionage relationship. In
order to reach this result, the Ninth Circuit
merged what it called the "venerable" Totten
doctrine with an evidentiary privilege that
applies to the discovery of classified
documents. When properly asserted, the so-
called state-secrets privilege allows the
government to withhold classified material
- in cases that are not otherwise barred
and subject to dismissal at the outset. It has
no bearing on cases which, as a result of
their subject matter (e.g., espionage
agreements), fall outside the courts'
jurisdiction.
Judge Richard Tallman - who, like Judge
Berzon, was appointed by President Clinton
- issued a strong dissenting opinion. He
noted that it is not the Ninth Circuit's role to
overrule the Supreme Court: "There has
been no change in the law of spy contracts
since Totten was decided in 1875. The secret
existence of the espionage relationship and a
claim for greater compensation was not
justiciable then; it is not justiciable now."
"Unlike the majority," said Judge Tallman,
"I have no difficulty rejecting the plaintiffs'
invitation to second-guess the DCI's
[Director of Central Intelligence]
determination of what information remains
harmful to national security..."
There is a lot that one could about this case.
But the absurdity of allowing former foreign
agents to sue the CIA should be obvious to
anyone not occupying a tenured faculty
position. The business of recruiting and
handling foreign intelligence assets is
obviously dirty and important work, which
is best left to the folks who engage in it for a
living. Such activities hardly lend
themselves to legal niceties like the finer
points of due process - much less to
litigation in the courts. To hold otherwise is
both unwise and dangerous.
The N inth C ircuit w as good e nough to file
its decision as "For Publication." That
means it can be cited as precedent in the
Ninth Circuit. One can only hope it won't be
for long.
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A couple who claimed they spied for the
United States during the Cold War have
sued the Central Intelligence Agency in
federal court, claiming it reneged on a
promise to support them .after they defected
and were set up in secret lives in King
County.
The man and woman are identified only as
John and Jane Doe, out of fear of retaliation
- even assassination by the unnamed
country they betrayed, according to the
lawsuit filed yesterday in Seattle.
They have spent nearly two years trying to
quietly resolve their dispute with the CIA,
which they allege is defying their civil rights
in the name of national security. The couple
say the agency has refused to consider their
claims, lied about their roles and blocked
access to documents and individuals who
could prove their case.
They are asking that the court order the
agency to uphold its agreement with them
and provide them with a fair and impartial
forum to resolve their grievances.
The man and woman have retained Seattle's
largest law firm, Perkins Coie, to represent
them. Both of their attorneys, Steven Hale
and Betsy Alaniz, have had to sign secrecy
agreements.
Both lawyers were reluctant to talk, citing
those agreements and the delicacy of their
clients' position.
Nevertheless, they say the issue is one of
fundamental fairness: whether the Does,
now U.S. citizens, should be afforded equal
protection and due process, or whether those
civil rights should be trumped by an agency
the lawsuit alleges has a long and ragged
history of mistreating defectors.
"What I will say is this: The issue here, in
this constitutional democracy, is where do
you draw that line?" asked Hale. "You have
to have some secrets. . . . But weighted
against that is a society that believes in rule
by law and that no man is above the law.
The question becomes whether secrecy is
more important than their due process."
The lawsuit names as defendants the CIA,
Director George Tenet and the U.S.
government.
Calls to CIA headquarters in L angley, Va.,
yesterday seeking comment were not
returned. Kate Pflaumer, U.S. attorney for
Western Washington, said she was unaware
of the suit and could not comment.
U.S. Rep. Norm Dicks, D-Wash., the
ranking Democrat on the House Select
Committee for Intelligence, was aware of
the couple's complaint and has spoken with
their attorney, said press secretary George
Behan.
"He has requested information from the
intelligence agency and we have intervened
to make sure (the attorney) gets what he
needs," Behan said this morning. "Beyond
that, because the matter is in litigation, we
can't comment."
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According to the lawsuit, John Doe was a
"high-ranking diplomat" for a country
identified only as an enemy of the United
States. He and his wife were stationed at an
embassy in a third country during the Cold
War. They were under constant surveillance
by their c ountry's security apparatus when,
at considerable risk, they approached a U.S.
Embassy official and asked to defect.
Instead, they claim, they were taken to a
CIA "safe house" and coerced into spying in
exchange for a promise that they would be
granted asylum later.
The agency, they claim, continued to string
them along, escalating their exposure until it
was "virtually guaranteed that the nature and
extent of these activities would become
known [. . .] putting them at lifelong risk of
retaliation, including the risk of
assassination," the lawsuit said.
Only then w ere they brought tot he United
States and given new identities, including
fabricated backgrounds. They settled in
King County.
Using h is n ew i dentity and a false r esume,
and with the help and support of the CIA,
Doe secured a job as an unspecified
professional. Financial support from the
agency decreased as his salary increased,
and eventually the CIA subsidy was
terminated altogether, the lawsuit claims.
In 1997, Doe was laid off, and he went to
the CIA for help, relying on earlier promises
that the agency would always provide
support. Because of his security status and
false identity, he's been unable to find work
since, the lawsuit says.
The lawsuit claims the CIA has cast the
Does adrift, refusing for a variety of reasons
to give them any support - all in alleged
breach of earlier promises.
The lawsuit asks the court to issue an
injunction ordering the CIA to resume its
payments and support of the Does. It also
seeks to compel the agency's director to put
in place a procedure secret or not that
assures the couple a fair and impartial airing
of their grievances.
If they have to, they will challenge the Civil
War-era doctrine that has allowed the
government to sidestep judicial review of its
secret deals.
The lawsuit claims the CIA has used that
policy, known as the Totten Doctrine, "to
block judicial enforcement of its lawful
obligations."
The Does also claim that Tenet has abused
the statutory authority granted by Congress
when the CIA was formed in 1947,
obligating him to take whatever steps are
necessary to "protect intelligence sources
and methods." He has used that authority,
they claim, to deny them any meaningful
method of redress.
The very existence of those sweeping
powers, the lawsuit claims, demands that the
CIA have scrupulously fair policies and
procedures to resolve disputes.
"If a citizen whose liberty or property is
subject to agency actions has no judicial
recourse and must avail himself or herself of
administrative procedures conducted in
secret, then those procedures must be as





Ruling Below: (Miller-El v. Dretke, 361 F.3d 849. Cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2908 (2004)).
Miller-El was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death at a jury trial. Miller-El
unsuccessful challenged the prosecution's jury selection process as racially biased during the
original trial, and subsequently sought habeas review and a Certificate of Appealability ("COA")
in order to secure the right to appeal the denial of his habeas petition. In Miller-El's appeal from
the trial court's denial of a COA, the Supreme Court found that Miller-El's constitutional claim
was "debatable" and remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit, which then granted the COA. The
case below is a review of the habeas petition on the merits.
During Miller-El's appeals, the Supreme Court decided Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986),
which created a three step process for reviewing claims of racial bias in jury selection. After the
defendant makes a prima facie showing that the peremptory challenges were made on the basis
of race, the prosecution must present a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory strike. Finally
trial court must determine whether in light of the evidence presented by both parties, the
prosecution acted primarily based on race. The Fifth Circuit reviewed only the trial court's
resolution of the third Batson step. The Fifth Circuit found that the defendant did not present
clear and convincing evidence that the trial court erred in its determination that the jury selection
was motivated by racial discrimination.
Question Presented: Whether the Fifth Circuit properly applied the clear and convincing
evidence standard of review to the third step in Batson to find that the jury selection process was
not racially biased.
Thomas Joe MILLER-EL, Petitioner-Appellant
V.
Douglas DRETKE, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional
Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellees
United States Court of Appeals
For the Fifth Circuit
Revised March 12, 2004
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
DeMoss, Circuit Judge: Kentucky, that the state trial c ourt erred i n
finding that there was no purposeful
Petitioner b rings t his federal habeas corpus discrimination in the selection of his jury.
petition claiming, pursuant to Batson v. The district court denied Petitioner relief.
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The district court then denied a certificate of
appealability ("COA"). Petitioner previously
appealed to this court and we denied a COA.
The Supreme Court reversed. We then
granted COA and now address the merits of
Petitioner's appeal.
BACKGROUND
[In 1985, Thomas Jo Miller-El, was indicted
for capital murder allegedly committed
during the armed robbery of a Holiday Inn
in Dallas, Texas. He pleaded not guilty, but
was convicted during the jury trial.]
[After voir dire and before his conviction,
Miller-El moved to strike the jury alleging
that the prosecution had systematically used
peremptory challenges to exclude blacks
during jury selection. The trial court
resolved the issue relying on Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759,
85 S. Ct. 824 (1965), which required Miller-
El to show that the prosecution's conduct
was "part of a larger pattern of
discrimination aimed at excluding blacks
from jury service." Miller-El did not satisfy
this test to the lower court and was
sentenced to death by the jury. Miller-El
appealed the jury selection issue to the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which
remanded the case for new findings in light
of the Supreme Court's ruling in 1986,
Batson v. Kentucky.]
[Batson] established a three-part process for
evaluating claims that a prosecutor used
peremptory challenges in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. 476 U.S. at 96-98.
First, a defendant must make a prima facie
showing that a peremptory challenge has
been exercised on the basis of race. Id. at
96-97. Second, if that showing has been
made, the prosecution must offer a race-
neutral basis for striking the juror in
question. Id. at 97-98. Third, in light of the
parties' submissions, the trial court must
determine whether the defendant has shown
purposeful discrimination. Id. at 98.
[The trial court heard new evidence, but
concluded in 1989 "that Miller-El's
evidence failed to satisfy step one of Batson
because it 'did not even raise an inference of
racial motivation in the use of the state's
peremptory challenges' to support a prima
facie case." The court also determined "that
the state would have prevailed on steps two
and three because the prosecutors had
offered credible, race-neutral explanations
for each black venire member excluded. The
court further found "no disparate
prosecutorial examination of any of the
venire [members] in question" and "that the
primary reasons for the exercise of the
challenges against each of the venire
[members] in question [was] their reluctance
to assess or reservations concerning the
imposition of the death penalty."]
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
denied Miller-El's appeal, and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari. Miller-El's state
habeas proceedings fared no better, and he
was denied relief by the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals.
[Miller-El unsuccessfully challenged the
legal validity of his conviction by filing] a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal
district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2254. ... Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, [he
then appealed the denial of the habeas
corpus by seeking a COA, a document
issued by the federal district court judge
supporting that a reasonable jury could find
it debatable that the prisoner's constitutional
rights have been violated. Without the COA
there is no right of appeal. Both the trial
court and the Fifth Circuit denied Miller-
El's application.] Miller-El appealed to the
Supreme Court and certiorari was granted.
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[The Court found in 2003] that the federal
district court's rejection of Miller-El's
Batson claim was "debatable" and thus we
had erred in not granting COA on Miller-
El's Batson claim. The Supreme
Court remanded the case to this Court to
determine whether Miller-El can
"demonstrate that [the] state court's finding
of the absence of purposeful discrimination
was incorrect by clear and convincing
evidence, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), and that
the corresponding factual determination was
'objectively unreasonable' in light of the
record before the court." Id. at 348. We
granted COA for precisely that
determination.
DISCUSSION
Claims of racial discrimination in jury
selection are evaluated according to the
framework established in Batson v.
Kentucky. . . . [After] the defendant . . .
make[s] a prima facie showing that the
prosecution has exercised peremptory
challenges on the basis of race, . . . the
burden shifts to the prosecution to provide a
race-neutral explanation for striking the
venire member in question. 476 U.S. at 96-
98... . [These first two steps are not at issue
in this case. The only issue in this case is the
third step, in which it is the defendant's
burden to prove] purposeful discrimination.
Id. at 98....
Miller-El argues that the state court's
finding of the absence of purposeful
discrimination was incorrect and the
corresponding factual determinations were
"objectively unreasonable" in light of the
following four areas of evidence that he
claims were before the court. First, evidence
of historical discrimination by the Dallas
County District Attorney's office in the
selection of juries. Second, the use of the
"jury shuffle" tactic by the prosecution.
Third, the alleged similarity between non-
black venire members who were not struck
by the prosecution and six blacks who were.
Fourth, evidence of so-called disparate
questioning with respect to venire members'
views on the death penalty and their ability
to impose the minimum punishment.
First, Miller-El argues that he presented
evidence of the Dallas County District
Attorney's office "unofficial policy" of
excluding blacks from jury service....
[The United States magistrate judge and
district court found] considerable evidence
that the Dallas County District Attorney's
office had an unofficial policy of excluding
blacks from jury service and that this
evidence was disturbing. . . . But both the
magistrate and district court noted that the
historical evidence, however disturbing, is
not determinative of whether there was
purposeful discrimination in the selection of
Miller-El's jury. . . . The Supreme Court
stated that proof "that the culture of the
District Attorney's Office in the past was
suffused with bias against African-
Americans in jury selection" is "relevant to
the extent it casts doubt on the legitimacy of
the motives underlying the State's actions"
in Miller-El's case. [Because] Miller-El has
already met the burden under the first step of
Batson ... historical evidence is relevant to
the extent that it could undermine the
credibility of the prosecutors' race-neutral
reasons. Here, however . . . the race-neutral
reasons are solidly supported by the record
and in accordance with the prosecutors'
legitimate efforts to get a jury of individuals
open to imposing the death penalty. The
state court, in the best position to make a
factual credibility determination, heard the
historical evidence and determined the
prosecutors' race-neutral reasons for the
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peremptory strikes to be genuine. Under our
standard of review, we must presume this
specific determination is correct and
accordingly the general historical evidence
does not prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the state court's finding of the
absence of purposeful discrimination in
Miller-El's jury selection was incorrect.
Second, [the court determined that] Miller-
El's circumstantial evidence of jury shuffles
does not overcome the race-neutral reasons
for exercising the challenged peremptory
strikes articulated by the prosecutors and
accepted by the state court who observed the
voir dire process including the jury shuffles.
Third, Miller-El argues that ... similarities
between non-black venire members who
were not struck by the prosecution and six
blacks who were [suggests] that the
following six black venire members were
victims of racially motivated peremptory
strikes: Roderick Bozeman, Billy Jean
Fields, Joe Warren, Edwin Rand, Carrol
Boggess, and Wayman Kennedy.
As to each of the black venire members
Miller-El claims were the victims of racially
motivated peremptory strikes, it is important
to identify the prosecution's stated reasons
for exercising a peremptory challenge. Once
we have identified the reasons for the strikes,
the credibility of the reasons is self-evident.
Further, we can determine from the record
that there were no unchallenged non-black
venire members similarly situated, such that
their treatment by the prosecution would
indicate the reasons for striking the black
members were not genuine.
Roderick Bozeman . . . classified himself as
the type of person who believed in the death
penalty in principle, but who could not
actually serve on a capital jury. He verified
his inability to impose the death penalty by
stating that e ven if t he evidence compelled
"cyes" answers to the special issues posed to
the jury at the punishment stage, he might
refuse to answer the questions honestly in
order to avoid imposing the death penalty.
The prosecution exercised a peremptory
challenge to remove Bozeman, citing his
views on the death penalty and on
rehabilitation, his belief that a pattern of
violent conduct would not be sufficient to
render a defendant deserving of death, and
his "obvious hesitation" concerning his
ability to override his personal feelings and
answer the special issues according to the
evidence.
Venire member Billy Jean Fields . . .
proclaimed that his religious belief was that
no one was beyond rehabilitation. . . .
Additionally, Fields indicated in his
questionnaire and in response to questions
by the prosecution that his brother had been
incarcerated numerous times for drug
offenses. The prosecution exercised a
peremptory challenge to remove Fields,
citing its concern that his deeply held
religious belief in the rehabilitative capacity
of all persons could impact his willingness
to impose a death sentence and the fact that
his brother had been convicted of a felony.
Venire member Joe Warren answered
questions during voir dire in a noncommital
manner and indicated ambivalence about the
death penalty and his ability to impose it....
The prosecution exercised a peremptory
challenge to remove Warren. At the Batson
hearing, the prosecutor cited Warren's
hesitation about imposing the death penalty
and his inconsistent responses during voir
dire as the reasons for striking him. The
prosecutor also noted that Warren was
struck relatively early in the jury selection
process when the state had ten challenges
remaining before exercising one to remove
Warren. The prosecutor noted at the Batson
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hearing that an attorney's strategy regarding
the use of peremptory challenges necessarily
changes as jury selection progresses and
peremptory challenges either remain unused
or get used more rapidly. In fact, the
prosecutor on cross-examination at the
Batson hearing admitted that he would have
struck non-black jurors Sandra Hearn and
Fernando Gutierrez, who also gave
somewhat ambivalent answers regarding the
death penalty, before Warren had they come
up earlier in the process.
Venire member Edwin Rand described
capital punishment as a "touchy subject"
during voir dire but did indicate on his
questionnaire that he believed in the death
penalty.. . . He said, "Somewhere along the
line, I would probably think to myself, you
know, 'Can I do this?' You know, right now
I say I can, but tomorrow I might not." The
prosecution exercised a peremptory
challenge to remove Rand, citing his
ambivalence about the death penalty
generally and his lack of ability to serve on a
capital jury.
Venire member Carrol Boggess indicated on
her questionnaire that she had a moral,
religious, or personal belief that would
prevent her from imposing the death
penalty. . . . Boggess also indicated that she
had testified as a defense witness at her
nephew's theft trial. The prosecution
exercised a peremptory challenge to remove
Boggess, citing as reasons for the strike her
hesitancy about assessing a death sentence
and the fact that she had served as a defense
witness in her nephew's trial.
Venire member Wayman Kennedy stated on
his questionnaire he believed in the death
penalty . . . only for mass murders or cases
involving mutilation . . . [and that] he did
not think a murder in the course of a robbery
would necessitate the death penalty because
"why wouldn't a life sentence be
enough." . . . The prosecution exercised a
peremptory challenge to remove Kennedy,
citing his hesitancy to assess the death
penalty for murder in the course of robbery,
the crime Miller-El was accused of, his view
that the death penalty was only appropriate
in extreme cases, and his hesitancy in stating
that he could answer the special issues
according to the evidence.
Miller-El claims that three non-black venire
members, Sandra Hearn, Marie Mazza, and
Ronald Salsini, expressed views about the
death penalty as ambivalent as those
expressed by Bozeman, Fields, Warren,
Rand, Boggess, and Kennedy, but the three
non-black venire members were not struck
by the prosecution. The record, especially
the voir dire transcript, does not support this
assertion.
Sandra Hearn stated in her jury
questionnaire and on voir dire that she
believed in the death penalty and could
assess it in appropriate cases. . . . Hearn also
stated she thought the death penalty should
be available for more than just murder but
also severe torture and extreme child
abuse. . . . Miller-El's counsel must have
believed Hearn was a pro-prosecution venire
member because he attempted to have her
challenged for cause on numerous grounds,
and when the trial judge found Hearn
qualified, Miller-El's counsel requested an
additional peremptory strike in order to
remove her. In fact, on direct appeal Miller-
El continued to argue that the trial court
erred in denying his challenge for cause of
Hearn, so it seems disingenuous to argue
now that she was similarly situated to the
black jurors who expressed reservations
about imposing the death penalty.
Venire member Maria Mazza indicated on
herj uror questionnaire thats he believed in
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the death penalty. When asked about her
feelings on the death penalty at voir dire, she
stated, "It's not an easy one and I feel that it
depends upon the case, the testimony . . . .
It's kind of hard determining somebody's
life, whether they live or die, but I feel that
is something that is accepted in our courts
now and it is something that - a decision that
I think I could make one way or the other."
Mazza served on Miller-El's jury.
Venire member Ronald Salsini stated he
believed in the death penalty and that he
could impose the death penalty. He did
indicate imposing the death penalty would
be difficult; however, he gave a hypothetical
crime based on his personal experience as a
bank teller that closely paralleled the crime
Miller-El was charged with and stated that
such a criminal act was deserving of the
death penalty. The prosecution did not strike
Salsini but Miller-El's counsel did.
Comparing the views expressed by Hearn,
Mazza, and Salsini to the views expressed
by the challenged black venire members, it
is clear that Hearn, Mazza, and Salsini were
not similarly situated for several reasons.
First, ambivalence about the death penalty
was not the sole reason for striking
Bozeman, Fields, or Boggess. Second,
Warren, Rand, and Kennedy were struck
mainly because of ambivalence about the
death penalty, but they each also expressed
doubts about whether they personally could
impose the death penalty even if the
evidence indicated the death penalty was
appropriate. . . . Under our federal habeas
standard of review, however, Miller-El has
not shown by clear and convincing evidence
that the trial court, who observed the voir
dire process, erred in finding the
prosecution's reason for striking Rand or the
other black venire members credible.
Next, Miller-El claims non-black
unchallenged venire members Hearn and
Kevin Duke expressed views on
rehabilitation similar to the views expressed
by the black challenged venire members.
Hearn's views have already been discussed.
Duke expressed support for the death
penalty and said he could impose it. Duke
made comments concerning rehabilitation in
the context of the availability of parole, not
in the context of whether the death penalty
was appropriate. Duke served on Miller-El's
jury.
Again, the record does not support Miller-
El's assertion. . . . Bozeman's and Fields'
views on rehabilitation were much stronger
than Hearn's and Duke's. Hearn and Duke
were not similarly situated to any challenged
black venire members.
Finally, Miller-El asserts that non-black
venire members Noad Vickery, Cheryl
Davis, Chatta Nix, and Joan Weiner were
similarly situated to challenged black venire
members who had family members with a
criminal background. [Vicory, Davis, and
Nix were strong state jurors and Miller-El
used peremptory strikes to remove them].
Weiner's ten-year-old son had once been
arrested for shoplifting. Weiner served on
Miller-El's jury.
Again, the record does not support Miller-
El's Batson claim. . .. In summary, Miller-
El has failed to identify any unchallenged
non-black venire member similarly situated
to the six struck black venire members on
whom he is basing his Batson claim.
Therefore, he has failed to demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that the state
court erred in finding the prosecution's
reasons for exercising its preliminary
challenges credible.
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Fourth, Miller-El also argues that the
prosecution posed different questions
concerning the death penalty and the
minimum allowable punishment to the
venire members depending on the race of
the venire member. The record, however,
reveals that the disparate questioning of
venire members depended on the member's
views on capital punishment and not race.
The prosecution used questioning to either
ferret out a venire member's views on the
death penalty or to establish a basis to
disqualify venire members who had
unfavorable views but were not subject to
disqualification on those grounds.
The prosecution questioned all venire
members concerning their views of the death
penalty. A majority of the venire members
were informed the state was seeking the
death penalty and that affirmative answers to
three questions submitted to the jury at the
punishment phase would result in Miller-El
being sentenced to death, and then asked
about their views concerning the death
penalty. Prosecutors did utilize a "graphic
script" to describe an execution in detail to
some venire members. Both black and non-
black venire members who had expressed
reservations never received the script....
Miller-El contends that there were ten black
venire members who expressed reservations
and seven of these venire members, who
were ultimately peremptory challenged by
the prosecution, got the script, while there
were ten non-black venire members who
expressed reservations but only two got the
script. Miller-El argues this disparity proves
purposeful discrimination and therefore the
trial court erred. A review of precisely what
the prosecution did in terms of voir dire
questioning indicates the trial court, who
observed the voir dire process, did not err in
finding there was no purposeful
discrimination.
Questioning on voir dire also indicates there
was no uncertainty as to the views of these
eight non-black venire members. They were
so opposed to the death penalty there was no
need to give them a detailed description....
The prosecution treated the black venire
members no differently....
In summary, sixteen venire members for
whom questionnaire information is available,
clearly indicated on the questionnaires their
feelings on the death penalty, and fifteen of
them did not receive the graphic script. The
one who did receive the script was non-
black venire member Sztybel. Eight venire
members gave unclear answers and those
eight venire members received the graphic
script. The answers given, not race,
accurately indicated whether a venire
member got the graphic script, and this is
confirmation of the prosecution's race-
neutral rationale.
The prosecution also did not question venire
members differently concerning their
willingness to impose the minimum
punishment for the lesser-included offense
of murder. Different questioning on the
minimum sentence issue was used as an
effort to get venire members the prosecution
felt to be ambivalent about the death penalty
dismissed for cause. . . . Seven black venire
members were given the allegedly
"manipulative" minimum punishment script,
all of whom were opposed to the death
penalty in varying degrees. . . . [One black
positive state juror was not given the script
because the prosecution wanted him on the
jury.]
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Likewise, there are no similarly situated
non-black venire members who, under the
prosecution's rationale, would have been
questioned about minimum sentencing. This
is true because unless a venire member
indicated he would be a poor state's juror
and would not otherwise be struck for cause
or by agreement, there was no reason to use
the "manipulative" script. Thus, of the ten
non-black venire members who expressed
opposition to the death penalty, eight were
struck for cause or by agreement, meaning
no "manipulative" script was necessary to
get them removed. . . . The other two non-
black venire members . . . were both given
the "manipulative" script and
peremptorily struck.
In summary, none of the four areas of
evidence Miller-El based his appeal on
indicate, either collectively or separately, by
clear and convincing evidence that the state
court erred. Therefore, the district court
correctly denied Miller-El habeas relief.
AFFIRMED.
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Death Row Inmate Back at High Court; Is 5th Circuit Defying a Supreme Court Ruling?
The National Law Journal
June 21, 2004
Marcia Coyle
Washington-A year after winning a rare
victory in the U.S. Supreme Court, a Texas
death row inmate, backed once again by a
group of prominent former judges and
prosecutors, is telling the high court that the
5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has
basically thumbed its nose at its first ruling.
Last year, in an 8-1 ruling, the high court
found that the lower courts had failed to give
"full consideration to the substantial
evidence" offered by Thomas Joe Miller-El,
who is black, that prosecutors had used
racial bias during jury selection in his 1986
capital murder trial. Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322.
That evidence included the exclusion of 10
of 11 eligible blacks from the jury pool in
Miller-El's trial; a history of discrimination
by Dallas prosecutors, including training
manuals that claimed "minority races almost
always empathize with the defendant"; jury
shuffles; and a 1986 newspaper report
showing that 90% of eligible blacks were
excluded by prosecutors using peremptory
challenges in 15 death penalty cases from
1980 to 1986.
The majority, led by Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy, sent the case back to the 5th
Circuit, which had refused to review Miller-
El's claim, with an explanation of how to
evaluate whether prosecutors had
purposefully discriminated.
Last March, the 5th Circuit, on remand,
rejected Miller-El's claim, holding that he
had failed to prove that prosecutors had
engaged in purposeful discrimination with
their peremptory challenges.
The high court on June 24 is expected to
consider whether to hear Miller-El's new
petition challenging what his lawyers call
the 5th Circuit's "begrudging approach to
claims of discrimination in jury selection"
under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986), and its "myopic application" of
Batson to Miller-El's case. Miller-El v.
Dretke, No. 03-9659.
Representing Miller-El, former Solicitor
General Seth Waxman of Washington's
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering and Jim Marcus
of the Texas Defender Service noted in their
petition that the 5th Circuit "literally
incorporated verbatim (without attribution)
analyses and discussions" from the
dissenting opinion by Justice Clarence
Thomas in the first Miller-El case and from
the state's unsuccessful brief in that same
case.
Opposing the petition, Texas argued that the
5th Circuit "considered all relevant
evidence" but found it insufficient to
overcome the state trial judge's finding "that
prosecutors struck prospective jurors, not
because of their race, but because of their
unfavorable case-related views."
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With a document in evidence that instructed
Dallas prosecutors to keep minorities off
juries and a command by the U.S. Supreme
Court to review his case, it appeared that
Thomas Miller-El's death row habeas writ
was the most viable Batson appeal in years.
Nevertheless, the 5 th U.S. Circuit C ourt of
Appeals recently conducted a detailed look
at the voir dire in Miller-El's 1986 capital
murder trial and, in its Feb. 26 opinion in
Miller-El v. Dretke, found no evidence of
racial discrimination.
Three experts believe Miller-El reaffirms
how difficult it is for criminal-defense
attorneys to prove there was racial bias in a
jury selection process - even with evidence
that a memo from the Dallas DA's office
advocated keeping minorities of jury panels
and that 91 percent of African-American
venire members were kept off Miller-El's
jury panel at his trial.
Even though prosecutors used peremptory
strikes to exclude 10 of the 11 blacks
eligible to serve on the panel for Miller-El's
trial, the 5th Circuit found that Miller-El
failed to show by clear and convincing
evidence that prosecutors used "purposeful"
discrimination in eliminating potential jurors,
the standard of proof required by the U.S.
Supreme Court's landmark opinion in
Batson v. Kentucky (1986), which prohibits
racial discrimination in jury selection.
Miller-El was convicted for the 1985
robbery and murder of an Irving hotel clerk.
He has contended for years that biased
prosecutors used peremptory strikes to keep
African-Americans off his jury panel
without cause; courts have rejected his
habeas writs four separate times, says Lori
Ordiway, chief of the appellate division of
the Dallas County District Attorney's Office.
After the 5th Circuit denied his certificate of
appealability, Miller-El appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court. Miller-El's appeal garnered
support from numerous former federal
prosecutors and judges - including William
Sessions, a former FBI director and a former
U.S. district judge for the Western District
of Texas - who filed an amicus brief
supporting Miller-El's appeal at the
Supreme Court.
On Sept. 25, 2003, the high court ordered
the 5th Circuit to reconsider Miller-El's
Batson claim to determine whether he "can
demonstrate that [the] state court's finding
of the absence of purposeful discrimination
was incorrect by clear and convincing
evidence and that the corresponding factual
determination was "objectively
unreasonable' in light of the record before
the court."
Miller-El's attorneys argued in briefs to the
5th Circuit that historical evidence and
peremptory strikes prosecutors used against
black jurors prejudiced Miller-El's right to a
fair trial. Miller-El is black. His attorneys
also argued that prosecutors improperly
called for jury shuffles and that nonminority
venire members who had relatives with
criminal backgrounds were not struck by
prosecutors, according to the 5th Circuit
opinion.
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But 5th Circuit Judge Harold R. DeMoss Jr.
disagreed, finding that Dallas County
Criminal District Court No. 5 had correctly
rejected Miller-El's habeas petition, which
included Batson claims of racial
discrimination during jury selection at his
trial.
"In summary, none of the four areas of
evidence Miller-El based his appeal on
indicate, either collectively or separately, by
clear and convincing evidence that the state
court erred," DeMoss wrote in an opinion
joined by Judges Edith Jones and Eugene
Davis. "Therefore, the district court
correctly denied Miller-El habeas relief."
The 5th Circuit's decision stuns one of
Miller-El's appellate attorneys.
"If a case like this doesn't win," says Jim
Marcus, executive director of the Texas
Defender Service, "it's hard to imagine how
you could prove a Batson violation." Marcus
has not decided if he'll ask for a rehearing at
the 5th Circuit or appeal again to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
But the decision does not surprise Ordiway,
who says the 5th Circuit is far from alone in
concluding that no racial discrimination
occurred during jury selection in Miller-El's
trial.
"We felt like the claim had been thoroughly
reviewed," Ordiway says. "And once the 5th
Circuit looked at it, we felt that they would
come out the same way."
Disturbing Memo
One of the most inflammatory pieces of
evidence the 5th Circuit examined was a
1963 "circular" from the Dallas District
Attorney's Office that instructed prosecutors
to exercise their peremptory strikes against
minorities. Henry Wade was the Dallas
district attorney from 1950 to 1986. The
circular was later adopted in a 1968 training
manual titled "Jury Selection in a Criminal
Case" that was still in use by the district
attorney's office as late as 1976, according
to the U.S. Supreme Court opinion.
The original 1963 circular provided the
following instruction to prosecutors: "Do
not take Jews, Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans or
a member of any minority race on a jury, no
matter how rich or well educated,"
according to the Supreme Court's opinion in
Miller-El.
Marcus alleges in an interview that Paul
Macaluso, one of the prosecutors involved
with Miller-El's trial, followed the
instructions in the DA's office training
manual.
"Do I have any doubt that Macaluso was
following the manual?" Marcus asks. "I
don't have any doubt at all."
Macaluso, who was a Dallas County
assistant district attorney from 1973 until
1988, says he read the manual on jury
selection before joining the DA's office and
"was disgusted with it."
"It was nonsense," says Macaluso, now an
assistant U.S. attorney in Dallas. "It was not
indoctrinated. "
Royce West, a partner in Dallas' West &
Gooden who defended Miller-El at trial and
now is a state senator, did not return two
telephone calls seeking comment before
presstime on March 4.
"The people I worked with on death-penalty
cases - Batson or no Batson - we were
looking for the best jurors regardless of
color," Macaluso says.
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While the 5th Circuit found the circular
disturbing, the judges concluded that the
Dallas prosecutors h ad race-neutral reasons
for striking African-American jurors.
"We also note that the apparent culture of
discrimination that existed in the past in the
Dallas County District Attorney's Office
and the individual discriminatory practices
that may have been practiced during the
time of Miller-El's jury selection by some
prosecutors are deplorable," DeMoss wrote.
"Here, however . .. the race-neutral reasons
[for striking black venire members] are
solidly supported by the record in
accordance with the prosecutor's legitimate
efforts to get a jury of individuals open to
imposing the death penalty," DeMoss wrote.
The 5th Circuit examined all of the reasons
prosecutors gave for striking black venire
members. Several of the venire members
stated they would not impose the death
penalty if they felt the defendant could be
rehabilitated. Some were ambivalent about
the death penalty and stated that they had
"mixed feelings" about capital punishment.
And some felt that the death penalty should
not be assessed if it were the defendant's
first criminal offense.
According to the 5th Circuit opinion, Miller-
El claimed that prosecutors asked different
questions of black venire members than of
white venire members during jury selection,
including u sing a "graphic script" - during
which they described the execution process
in detail. Prosecutors used the script to ferret
out jurors who had reservations about
imposing the death penalty.
But the 5th Circuit found that black and
white jurors were treated the same by
prosecutors, regardless of the script.
"The prosecution treated the black venire
members no differently," according to the
opinion, which noted that black venire
members who answered "yes" when asked if
they supported the death penalty on a
questionnaire were not read the graphic
script.
"The black venire members who were given
the graphic formulation, by contrast, gave
ambiguous answers on their juror
questionnaires expressing a combination of
uncertainty and philosophical opposition to
the death penalty," according to the opinion.
Not Strong
Three criminal law experts believe that
Miller-El contains the strongest Batson
claims the 5th Circuit has heard in years.
Even so, the case illustrates how hard it is to
prove racial discrimination in jury selection.
"Batson is sort of not the really major
problem that everybody thought it was going
to be when it first came up," says Fred Moss,
a criminal law professor at Southern
Methodist University Dedman School of
Law. "It seems that just about any colorable
argument will get past a Batson challenge."
William Delmore, chief of the legal services
bureau of the Harris County District
Attorney's Office, welcomes Miller-El.
"The defense did a good job of making the
argument that the challenges were [pretexts].
But they were legitimate," Delmore says.
"And speaking just for the prosecutors in
this office, we don't have any incentive to
remove black jurors," Delmore says. "And
we understand the black jurors are often
victims of crime, they're fine citizens, and
there is no reason to exclude them from
juries."
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Philip Wischkaemper, who serves as the
capital assistance attorney for the Criminal
Defense Lawyers Association, says Miller-
El shows that Batson claims are not the
strongest issues to bring up in habeas writs.
"Just almost anything will do for
challenging somebody pre-emptively as long
as it's not related to race," Wischkaemper
says. "It's like harmless error. It's so hard
for many of these defendants to articulate
harm."
Still, Wischkaemper says he'll keep advising
habeas attorneys to file Batson claims on
behalf of their clients if the facts warrant it.
"I'm certainly not going to discourage
anyone from pursing a Batson claim,"
Wischkaemper says. "You never know."
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An appeals court has ruled against a Texas
death row inmate who claimed Dallas
County prosecutors wrongly excluded
blacks from the jury during his 1986 trial.
The case of Thomas Miller-El, who is black,
gained national attention last year when the
U.S. Supreme Court found that "the culture
of the district attorney's office (in Dallas) in
the past was suffused with bias against
African-Americans" and that
"happenstance" could not explain why 10
out of 11 potential black jurors were turned
away by the prosecutor during jury selection
in Miller-El's case.
But the high court's ruling was only
procedural. It ordered the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals in New Orleans to review Miller-
El's claim that his jury was picked on racial
grounds.
A three-judge panel for the lower court ruled
Wednesday that Miller-El's attorneys failed
to provide "clear and convincing evidence"
that blacks were improperly passed over
during jury selection.
"The Supreme Court used some harsh
language about the historical practices of
this office, but those didn't affect what
happened in this case," said Lori Ordiway,
chief of the Dallas County district attorney's
office appellate section. "There was no
racial discrimination."
She said the ruling proved "what we have
said all along. . . . Jurors were struck for the
purpose of getting a fair jury that would
consider imposing the death penalty."
Jim Marcus, Miller-El's appeals lawyer and
director of the Houston-based Texas
Defender Service, said he intends to take the
case back to the Supreme Court. "If you
can't prove discrimination here, where 10 of
11 blacks who are qualified to serve are let
go, then (the law on the issue) is dead
letter."
In November 1985, Miller-El, his wife, and
another man robbed a Holiday Inn in Dallas
during which two employees were ordered
to lie on the floor. The employees were
gagged and bound. Miller-El shot one victim,
Doug Walker, twice in the back, killing him.
He shot the other, Donald Ray Hall, in the
side. Hall is now paralyzed from the chest
down.
Miller-El's execution, which was scheduled
for February 2003, was stayed pending his
appeal.
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High Court Revisits Racial Bias in Jury Selection
The Christian Science Monitor
October 16, 2002
Warren Richey
WASHINGTON - The Sixth Amendment to
the US Constitution guarantees in all
criminal cases trial by an impartial jury.
That means a group of individuals
comprised of a cross section of the
community willing and able to judge the
evidence without affording special
consideration to either the prosecutor or the
defendant.
But what happens when race enters the
equation?
In some jurisdictions in the US, prosecutors
long followed a secret policy of excluding as
many African-Americans as possible from a
jury whenever the defendant was black.
They did so because they believed that
African-American jurors would be more
likely than other jurors to acquit black
defendants regardless of the evidence
presented at trial.
The US Supreme Court ruled in 1986 that
such jury-selection tactics are
unconstitutional in a case called Batson v.
Kentucky. But the issue of jurors and race
remains an Achilles heel of the American
system of justice.
Wednesday, the US Supreme Court is
examining the s election o f a jury in D allas
County, Texas, that took place two months
before the court's 1986 Batson decision. At
issue is whether Texas death-row inmate
Thomas Joe Miller-El was denied a fair trial
when prosecutors excluded 10 of 11
qualified African-Americans from his jury.
A closely watched case
Aside from the obvious importance to Mr.
Miller-El, the case is significant because it
may offer judges, prosecutors, and defense
counsel nationwide firm guidance on how to
handle claims of racial discrimination injury
selection.
But the case could also represent something
of a crossroads for the court.
On one side, a majority of justices have
recently shown a heightened concern about
the fairness of procedures used in death-
penalty cases. On the other hand, a majority
of justices have also upheld Congressional
efforts to short-circuit the use of federal
habeas petitions - like Miller-El's - to
challenge death sentences.
Legal analysts will be watching closely
during Wednesday's oral argument for clues
about how the justices view the case. They'll
be paying particular attention to the centrist,
swing judge, Anthony Kennedy.
"This case comes to this court from a dark
chapter of blatant and open racial
discrimination in jury selection," writes Jim
Marcus of Texas Defender Service in
Houston in his brief to the court on behalf of
Miller-El.
"If the blatant discrimination patent in this
record is not condemned, then the subtler
forms of unconstitutional race
discrimination that sometimes, regrettably,
occur in jury selection in our own era are
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much more likely to go undetected," Mr.
Marcus says.
Controversial Winnowing decision
Officials with the Texas Attorney General's
Office say the Dallas County prosecutors
acted properly during jury selection in
Miller-El's case. The prosecutors removed
those jurors who expressed unfavorable
views about the death penalty, regardless of
their race, says Gena Bunn, chief of the
Capital Litigation Division of the Texas
Attorney General's Office, in her brief.
"The vast majority of nonminority panelists
favored t he d eath p enalty and w ere willing
to impose it, while the vast majority of
African-American panelists were either
opposed to the death penalty or were
unwilling to impose it," Ms. Bunn says.
"Thus, to the extent that a greater percentage
of A frican-Americans were [ excluded from
the jury], those percentages mirror divergent
views on the death penalty of minority and
nonminority [prospective jurors]," she says.
The panel that sentenced Miller-El to death
was comprised of one African-American,
nine whites, a Latino, and a Filipino-
American.
When confronted with the jury
discrimination issue in the wake of the 1986
Supreme Court decision, Miller-El's trial
judge ruled that the Dallas County
prosecutors were entitled to exclude the
prospective black jurors. The judge said that
there was no evidence of specific
discriminatory intent by the prosecutors.
Lawyers for Miller-El counter that the trial
judge did not give enough weight to
evidence that the Dallas County District
Attorney's office maintained a longtime
pattern and practice of using race in jury
selection to help secure convictions.
A 'how to' manual on discrimination
In the 1960s and 1970s, they say, the office
offered formal training in discriminatory
jury-selection tactics and even printed a
manual to help clarify the issue for new
prosecutors. "Do not take Jews, Negroes,
Dagos, Mexicans or a member of any
minority race on a jury, no matter how rich
or how well educated.... [T]hey will not do
on juries," says a 1963 Dallas County
training manual quoted by Miller-El's
lawyers.
Elisabeth Semel of the Death Penalty Clinic
of the University of California School of
Law in Berkeley says the judge at Miller-
El's trial failed to give proper weight to the
long history of jury selection discrimination
in Dallas County. That history, combined
with the fact that prosecutors excluded 10 of
11 African-American prospective jurors
should define a constitutional violation
under the Batson decision, she says.
George Kendall of the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund agrees. He
says the Supreme Court should require trial
judges to consider all the facts relevant to
allegations of racial discrimination in jury
selection.
"Unless the case is before a very
conscientious judge, Batson is not worth the
paper it is printed on," Mr. Kendall says.
Which judge should judge?
But lawyers for Texas counter that the trial
judge in Miller-El's case made the necessary
determinations in accord with the Batson
decision. They say Miller-El is simply
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looking for an appeals court judge willing to
agree with him.
The trial judge is in a better position than
appeals-court judges to determine whether
prosecutors acted properly, lawyers for
Texas say. "The trial judge is essentially a
witness to the very conduct alleged to be
discriminatory," Ms. Bunn says in her brief.
She says factual determinations by trial
courts in such cases should be accorded
"great deference."
Ms. S emel says t he issue is much b roader:
"It really has to do with whether or not we
are going to have a criminal justice system
in which we vigorously protect the right of
all citizens to participate in the jury system."
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The Supreme Court ruled yesterday that an
African American on death row in Texas
should get another chance to have his
sentence overturned because of alleged
racial bias at his 1986 murder trial - a
decision that sent a firm reminder to state
and lower federal courts that they must
guard against constitutional violations in the
criminal justice system.
By a vote of 8 to 1, with Justice Clarence
Thomas d issenting, the court ruled that the
New Orleans-based U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 5th Circuit should have granted
Thomas Joe Miller-El a hearing on his claim
that Dallas County district attorneys violated
his constitutional right to a discrimination-
free trial by summarily excluding 10 out of
11 blacks who were eligible to serve on the
jury in his case.
"In this case, the statistical evidence alone
raises some debate as to whether the
prosecution acted with a race-based reason
when striking prospective jurors," Justice
Anthony M. K ennedy wrote int he o pinion
of the court.
Capital punishment foes and advocates of
changes in the criminal justice system had
argued that Miller-El's case was an
egregious example of why many Americans,
especially m inonities, distrust state criminal
justice systems. And a Supreme Court that
has not often looked favorably on
defendants' efforts to reverse state criminal
judgments seemed to agree.
"The court is saying that the job here is not
to rubber-stamp the state courts, that you
have to be vigilant about having the
opportunity to check constitutional
violations," said Diann Rust-Tierney,
director of the American Civil Liberties
Union's Capital Punishment Project.
In his dissent, Thomas said Miller-El's
"arguments rest on circumstantial evidence
and speculation."
The Miller-El case was one of many cases
brought in recent years by death row
inmates trying to sustain constitutional
claims in the streamlined federal death-
penalty appeal process set up by Congress in
the 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The law
limited death row inmates' ability to
challenge their sentences in federal court,
thus making them more dependent on state
courts for the protection of their
constitutional rights.
AEDPA embodied an approach favored by
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and
other conservative members of the Supreme
Court, but yesterday's eight-member
majority showed that there are still limits to
the deference the federal judiciary gives to
state court rulings.
Yesterday's ruling could help some state
inmates get federal court reviews of their
sentences, particularly in the 5th Circuit,
whose jurisdiction encompasses Texas, the
country's I eading death penalty s tate. T hat,
in turn, means that state courts will have to
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take more care in reviewing claims of racial
bias and other constitutional violations, legal
analysts said.
In turning down Miller-El's request for a
hearing, the 5th Circuit appeals court had
said that he lacked "clear and convincing"
proof of racial bias, but this was the wrong
legal standard, the Supreme Court ruled. The
high court said that, to gain a hearing, all
Miller-El needed to show was that his claim
"was debatable among jurists of reason."
To prove racial discrimination in the use of
peremptory strikes by the prosecution,
Miller-El must show that prosecutors had no
credible race-neutral reason to exclude a
disproportionate number of blacks. And,
under AEDPA, he will still have to produce
"clear and convincing" evidence that the
state judge who ruled that his evidence "did
not even raise an inference of racial
motivation" was wrong.
Though that question was not for the high
court to decide, the justices seemed to credit
Miller-El's case. Kennedy wrote that it was
"relevant" that the Dallas County district
attorney's office had been "suffused with
bias" in the past, including in the use of a
1963 circular instructing prosecutors, "Do
not take Jews, Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans ...
on a jury." Kennedy accused both the state
court and the 5th Circuit court of a
"dismissive and strained interpretation" of
the facts.
A jury of nine whites, an Asian American, a
Latino and an African American found
Miller-El guilty of capital murder in the
brutal slaying of a Holiday Inn employee,
Doug Walker, in November 1985.
Miller-El alleges that the prosecutors
manipulated the jury pool by asking
potential black jurors deceptive and leading
questions, and by exploiting a unique Texas
practice called a "jury shuffle" to move
blacks out of the front rows of the jury pool.
All of this, Miller-El argues, reflected the
lingering influence in 1986 of longstanding
discriminatory practices in jury selection by
the Dallas County district attorney - as
evidenced by testimony from former
prosecutors and internal documents.
Prosecutors counter that their office had
ended its racially biased practices by 1986
and that what Miller-El depicts as racial
discrimination was actually a race-neutral
effort to find and remove potential jurors
who would be reluctant to impose the death
penalty.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote separately to
say that, although he agreed with the
majority's legal interpretation, he thought
the Texas authorities had a plausible case.
In his dissenting opinion, Thomas flatly
agreed with them. He noted that prosecutors
aggressively questioned both white and
black jurors who seemed ambivalent about
the death penalty.
He said that the 5th Circuit court was right
in this case to insist on "clear and
convincing" evidence of state court error
before permitting Miller-El a hearing,
adding that "the simple truth is that
petitioner has not presented anything
remotely resembling 'clear and convincing'
evidence of purposeful discrimination."
Thomas called the evidence of past
discrimination by the Dallas district attorney
"entirely circumstantial."
The case is Miller-El v. Cockrell, No. 01-
7662.
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